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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first paper estimates demand for
gasoline in the presence of two types of imperfect price information: ex-ante uncertainty
about each station’s price and uncertainty about the distribution of all stations’ prices.
Volatile wholesale cost causes retail gasoline prices to fluctuate regularly, making it difficult
for consumers to remain aware of the overall price level in the market or the stations
offering the lowest price. In this article, I develop a model in which consumers formulate
their prior belief of the current price distribution using the prices observed during past
driving trips, and then Bayesian update their beliefs with each new price observed, before
deciding whether to purchase gasoline or continue searching for a cheaper price. I estimate
this model by utilizing a unique data set of station-level daily gasoline sales and prices,
combined with data on the empirical distribution of various traffic flows. My empirical
results suggest that consumers are able to learn about the overall price increases or decreases
resulting from the wholesale cost movements relatively quickly. In addition, I find that price
distribution uncertainty is the primary component of imperfect price information, and if
it were eliminated, consumers could achieve 70 percent of the total savings that could be
realized by having perfect price information. Furthermore, by incorporating travel patterns,
the estimation suggests that cross-price elasticity between two stations depends largely on
the amount of common traffic they share.
My second paper studies the effect of complexity in multi-dimensional bidding and
competition in A+B (price + quality) auctions using a laboratory experiment. I examine
whether the behaviors of human bidders are consistent with the predictions of two alter-
ii
native models of auctions: the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium model and the Quantal Response
Equilibrium (QRE) model. I extend the QRE framework to multi-dimensional A+B auc-
tions. The results indicate that the QRE model, as a generalization of the rational models of
behavior by allowing decision making errors, predicts bidder behaviors well across different
treatments as the number of bidders and the dimensionality of the bid vary.
iii
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Chapter 1
Consumer Search with Learning:
A Structural Estimation of
Gasoline Demand1
1.1 Introduction
Many markets are characterized by frequent changes in prices due to rapidly varying
market conditions. In these cases, (i) ex-ante uncertainty about each seller’s price, and
perhaps more importantly, (ii) uncertainty about the distribution of all sellers’ prices arise,
causing market inefficiencies, including differences in the asking prices among sellers even for
homogeneous goods. For example, consumers may not buy from the least expensive seller if
it is too costly for them to keep searching for the lowest price or if they are unaware of the
existence of this lowest price. When both types of uncertainty are present, consumers engage
in costly search not only to realize price offered by sellers (searching), but also to update
their beliefs about the current price distribution (learning). While there is rich theoretical
and empirical literature that has focused on consumer price search, it has largely ignored
1This chapter is part of a project that I am working with Frank A. Wolak.
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the second type of uncertainty by assuming consumers know the current price distribution.2
Moreover, the few empirical papers that have incorporated both types of uncertainty have
not estimated the consumer learning process.3
In this study we investigate consumer search with learning behavior in the context
of the retail gasoline market. Two salient features, which are depicted in Figure 1.1, make
the retail gasoline market an ideal place for analyzing this phenomenon. First, frequent
price changes resulting from a volatile wholesale cost make it difficult for consumers to
maintain accurate price information for each station as well as the distribution of these
prices.4 Second, the uncertainty of consumers’ beliefs about the current price distribution
is often used to explain the asymmetric price response to changes in cost (Lewis, 2011).
In particular, when consumers do not know the current price distribution, they may form
their initial perception based on prices observed during past driving. In this case, when
prices and costs decrease, consumers’ beliefs of the price distribution tend to be too high,
resulting in low expected gains and less searching, which, in turn, causes higher profit
margins for the seller. If consumers follow this behavior, then assuming that they know
the current price distribution will lead to upward-biased estimates of search costs (either
high search costs or low expected gains from this search can contribute to the low levels of
search). Consequently, welfare analysis may overstate the benefits of policies that reduce
2Pioneer works, such as Stigler (1961) and McCall (1970), among others have established the theoretical
foundation for models of consumer search and emphasize the importance of search frictions in explaining
imperfectly competitive market behavior under the assumption that consumers know the price distribu-
tion. Under this key assumption, a large number of empirical papers have estimated the search costs that
contribute to sustained price dispersion in various market, for example, Hong and Shum (2006) on on-
line textbooks; Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) on S&P index funds; Wildenbeest (2011) on supermarkets;
Koulayev (2014) on hotel bookings online; Honka (2014) on auto insurance; ? on automobile markets; De los
Santos et al. (2012) and De los Santos (2018) on online books; Nishida and Remer (2018) on retail gasoline
markets.
3Rothschild (1974) was the first to develop a theoretical model in which consumers search and learn
about the price distribution in the process. To our knowledge, Koulayev (2013) and De los Santos et al.
(2017) are the only two papers that integrate consumer search with learning in empirical work. However, in
both papers, parameters that determine the consumer learning process are not estimated but chosen by the
researchers.
4Although we focus on how changing market conditions cause uncertainty about the price distribution
in this paper, inexperience about the market can also contribute to this uncertainty. Using survey data,
Matsumoto and Spence (2016) find that college students who have no prior experience in purchasing text-
books online tend to expect online prices to be higher than what are observed empirically, and consumers
with more experience in the marketplace generally have more accurate beliefs about the price distribution,
which is consistent with learning.
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information uncertainty or restrict firm entry in an attempt to lessen the total costs of the
search process.
Figure 1.1: Average City Gasoline Price and Cost
Notes: This figure plots both the average gasoline price in our sample
before federal and state taxes are applied and the Gulf Coast regular
spot price as a measure of wholesale cost of retail gasoline.
In this paper, we propose a model of search with learning that builds on Rothschild
(1974), with an emphasis on spatial and ex-ante vertical differentiation of sellers. We apply
the model to a retail gasoline market where consumers are assumed to formulate their prior
beliefs on the current price distribution using the prices observed in the past, and then
Bayesian update their beliefs with each new price observed along their predetermined travel
routes, before deciding whether to purchase gasoline or continue searching. Consumers
maximize their utility from a gasoline purchase by comparing if the realized utility at
each station after observing its price is higher than the expected value of the remaining
stations on the route and the alternative of waiting to purchase during a future trip. If
consumers observe a price higher than expected price at a station, they continue driving
since they expect to find lower prices at their remaining options on the route. However,
learning influences consumers’ purchase decisions because as they sample additional high
prices, and the newly obtained price information begins to outweigh their prior beliefs, their
3
posterior beliefs of the actual price distribution are adjusted upward. They are now more
likely to make a purchase as they believe that prices at other stations are higher.
To estimate the model, this study uses a novel dataset of daily transactions from
each gasoline station in a city from December 14, 2014, to May 31, 2016, and combine
it with data on daily prices and an empirical distribution of travel routes. We model a
station’s daily gasoline sales as an aggregation of purchase decisions made by individuals
who are searching and learning along their predetermined travel routes. Our estimation
result suggests that consumers update their beliefs of the current price distribution rather
quickly with each newly observed price. This trend is consistent with the fact that the
distribution of gasoline prices changes regularly, and as a result, prices sampled today are
more informative about the current price distribution than past price observations. This
modeling of the learning process not only allows us to estimate a more realistic and flexible
formation of consumers’ beliefs, but also enables us to answer the question of how much
consumers would benefit if they knew the current price distribution instead of assuming it
is currently the situation. After controlling for the spatial and vertical differentiation of
gasoline stations, counterfactual analyses suggest that consumers would save 1.12 cents per
gallon of gasoline purchased if uncertainty about the price distribution were removed, and
they would save 1.60 cents per gallon if they had perfect information ex-ante about prices.
Although the estimated savings are small, they are non-trivial, since gasoline demand at
the station level is highly price sensitive, with an estimated elasticity on the order of -9.
Moreover, it suggests that uncertainty about the actual price distribution is the primary
component of imperfect information. For instance, providing consumers with information
about the current price distribution alone can result in a realization of 70 percent of the
total saving if they were to know all of the prices.
Our approach is also unique as it uses data on consumers’ travel patterns to con-
struct the distribution of the consumers’ search sequence of gasoline stations. Most em-
pirical papers that structurally estimate consumer search models using only market-level
data assume consumers’ search sequence to be random because individuals’ search histories
4
are unobserved. However, travel patterns naturally constrain the search order when sellers
have physical addresses.5 Even for sellers without physical addresses, the order of visits
can be affected by such constraints as the layout of a web-page.6 By taking into account
traffic data, we are able to improve upon the assumption of random sampling and replace
it with observable variation, allowing the model to identify more realistic substitution pat-
terns. While random sampling implies homogeneous substitution patterns between any two
sellers, we find that 35 percent of the variation in the estimated elasticity of substitutions is
explained by the number of common drivers shared between two stations. In other words,
two stations are close competitors if they share a large number of common drivers, regard-
less of the distance between them. One station’s price may not affect another’s residual
demand if they do not share any common drivers.
Our panel data allow us to estimate separately parameters that govern the consumer
learning process and the distribution of the costs for postponing purchase. As volatile whole-
sale costs change the distribution of prices from day-to-day, variation in consumers’ prior
beliefs, which are based on past observed prices, is generated. The variation in consumers’
prior beliefs across days leads to variation in consumers’ purchase behaviors across days
that is independent of the distribution of the costs for postponing purchase. The weight
consumers place on their prior beliefs determines how quickly their posterior beliefs are
updated with the newly observed price information. Our model identifies this weight based
on how consumers’ purchase behavior today is affected by the information obtained in the
past.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it is the first paper to estimate
how quickly consumers update their prior beliefs of the unknown price distribution without
consumer-level search information. Second, by doing so, we are able to quantify the addi-
tional amount of market inefficiency created by the uncertainty of the price distribution,
5Arbatskaya (2007) develops a theoretical model of ordered consumer search, finding that sellers’ prices
and profits are affected by the order of search.
6As evidenced by Kim et al. (2010), if two products sold online are not being searched together, the
cross-price elasticities are numerically zero. There is also growing literature focusing on improving online
platform design to reduce search frictions and increase competition (Dinerstein et al., 2018).
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an outcome of consumers searching too much or too little compared to the optimum if they
knew the actual price distribution. Third, this paper uses data on consumer travel pat-
terns to simulate their search histories in a consumer search framework, thus relaxing the
assumption of random sampling widely adopted by search literature when search histories
are not observed. Although this feature is most relevant for the retail gasoline market, as
more data about consumers’ GPS movements data become available, they can be utilized
to formalize how consumers search when their individual search histories have not been
observed for a variety of markets.
1.2 Data
In the absence of micro-data of consumers’ search histories of gasoline stations and
purchase decisions, we use market-level data to make inferences about consumers’ search
and learning behavior that leads to gasoline purchase. Our sample consists of 47 gasoline
stations in a mid-sized city, with a population of approximately 75,000 in the urbanized
area.78 The sample period runs from December 14, 2014, to May 31, 2016, for a total of
535 days, during which time we observe daily price of gasoline at all 47 stations and the
daily gasoline transaction volume for 35 of these stations. We combine gasoline data with
data on traffic flows for our estimation. Under the assumption that consumers purchase
gasoline along their predetermined travel route, daily transactions at a gasoline station, as
an outcome of individual purchase decisions, provide information about their searching and
learning behavior concerning prices. The empirical distribution of these travel routes are
constructed based on the data on traffic flows. In the following subsections, we describe the
three main sources of data used for our empirical analysis.
7City name is not disclosed for the protection of the identities of the gas stations.
8Since the main focus of the paper is to study consumers’ search behavior in the gasoline market, we
excluded 14 stations from the city that do not meet the criteria of a station that competes for gasoline
sales among the searching consumers. These criteria include a large price board where gasoline prices
are distinctively visible and advertised to consumers, a large forecourt, and easy accessible entrance and
exit. Almost all excluded gasoline stations are mom-and-pop stations with a small gasoline sales volume
and primarily rely on sales inside the convenience store. Seven of eight excluded stations with matching
transaction data have gasoline sales less than or at the same level as the smallest volume stations in the
sample.
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1.2.1 Gasoline Price Data
We collected per gallon prices of regular unleaded gasoline from two gasoline price
gathering websites. The primary source was MapQuest.com, an online web mapping service
whose gasoline price data are provided by Oil Price Information Service (OPIS).9 We vis-
ited MapQuest.com daily and web-scraped the prices for every station in the city. However,
not every station’s price was updated daily by the website. For an average station in the
city, a new price was updated on 54 percent of the days.10 To address the issue of missing
prices, we complemented MapQuest.com’s data with the price data collected daily from
GasBuddy.com.11 Unlike MapQuest.com, prices on GasBuddy.com are uploaded by volun-
teer spotters in the area. To minimize any issues caused by the potential inaccuracy of the
prices reported on GasBuddy.com, we filled in only the station-day missing MapQuest.com
price with prices from GasBuddy.com.12 The matching of stations across two data sources
was based on the geometric coordinates of the stations, cross-validated with Google Map’s
geometric coordinates to ensure accuracy.13 After merging the price data, a station has, on
average, missing prices for 9.2 percent of the sample days. We filled in these missing prices
with the most recent price observed at that station. The average time lapse for which we
imputed price was 1.6 days.14 In addition to price data, we also obtained information on
station characteristics, including name, brand, address and geometric coordinates.
9OPIS obtains price information from credit card transactions and direct feeds from gas stations.
10The price coverage rate is slightly lower than other studies that directly use OPIS price data. One
possible reason is that the city of interest is a mid-sized city with a higher share of low-volume stations than
the major cities studied by other papers. Fewer credit card transactions result in fewer price feeds to OPIS.
11Gasoline price data collected from MapQuest.com and GasBuddy.com are widely used in the literature
on retail gasoline prices, for example, Lewis and Marvel (2011) and Remer (2015).
12Atkinson (2008) shows that although occasional error of the published prices may occur on Gas-
Buddy.com, these prices are still able to identify the features of retail gasoline price competition accurately.
13A station’s name or address cannot be used as a unique identifier for the matching because a station’s
name is not unique to a station and different websites may use different aliases for a street or highway.
14In our structural estimation, missing prices cannot be accommodated, because a station’s price affects
many stations’ sales through the traffic network, and one missing price will result in a large number of lost
observations.
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1.2.2 Gasoline Transaction Data
Daily expenditure data at the station level were obtained from a major financial
services provider.15 These data reflect the total dollar amount of purchases from all debit
and credit card users of this provider at each gas station on each day. We obtained two
types of expenditure data from the card users for 35 of the 47 stations, pay-at-pump and
in-store purchases. However, to eliminate the measurement error caused by non-gasoline
transactions, we use only pay-at-pump transactions. We construct a daily measure of the
total quantity of gasoline purchased at each station by dividing the total pay-at-pump
expenditures by the price of regular unleaded gasoline at the station on that day.16 We
believe that our measure of the total quantity of gasoline transacted at each station provides
a good representation of the behavior of consumers searching for gasoline.
1.2.3 Empirical Distribution of Search Routes
As individuals drive along their travel routes, the decision to purchase gasoline at
a particular station is affected by the prices observed prior to this station as well as the
price expected for the remaining stations on the route. As a result, the search sequence of
stations is essential for our analysis of consumers’ searching and learning behavior in the
market. In this study, we define a search route as a unique set of an ordered sequence of
stations visited. In our model of consumer search with learning, an individual’s decision
is then modeled at the search route level. We constructed an empirical distribution of
search routes describing the predicted number of consumers to drive past a specific ordered
sequence of stations on an average day.
First, we constructed the empirical distribution of the travel routes comprising two
elements: (i) the number of drivers traveling from an origin to a destination, and (ii)
the route that drivers took along the street network connecting the two points. For the
15The name of the provider as well as the names and locations of stations in the data have been withheld
to protect confidentiality.
16This calculation introduces potential measurement error, as it overestimates the quantity transacted
for mid-grade and premium gasoline, which have higher prices. However, it has been estimated that only 15
percent of gasoline transactions are mid-grade or premium.
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first element, we obtained the Origin and Destination Table from the state’s Department
of Transportation,17 which contains information about the estimated number of drivers
traveling from one Traffic Analysis Zone (TAZ) to another TAZ. This Table covers the
entire county that includes the city of interest as well as six additional surrounding counties.
The entire area is divided into approximately 1800 TAZs, each also associated with census
information about the residents living in the zone. Table 1.1 summarizes the TAZ and the
associated demographics of the residents in the county where the city of interest is located.
We can see that the TAZs are extremely fine, with 75 percent of the traffic zones occupying
an area of less than 1.5 km2. The larger traffic zones are at the fringe of the county with
few residents.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of the Traffic Analysis Zones
(TAZs)
mean std 25% 50% 75%
Area size (km2) 2.71 6.64 0.13 0.49 1.49
Population 668.31 920.13 141.50 357.00 733.00
Pop income > 50k 115.62 191.79 11.62 46.46 127.04
Note: The number of Traffic Analysis Zones is around 300. The exact number
is not reported for the protection of the identity of the city.
To compute the route that drivers take traveling from an origin TAZ to a destination
TAZ, we assume that all drivers take the travel route that minimizes driving time. We se-
lected the centroid of the origin and destination TAZ as the drivers’ start and end locations,
and for every origin and destination TAZ pair, a single fastest travel route following the
street network in the area was generated. We used the ArcGIS Network Analyst package to
calculate the fastest travel route and the road network data set was obtained from ArcGIS
StreetMap North America.1819
17The Origin and Destination Table is an output of the travel demand model constructed by the Depart-
ment of Transportation to forecast the traffic in year 2020.
18ArcGIS Network Analyst extension: https://www.esri.com/en-us/arcgis/products/
arcgis-network-analyst/overview. StreetMap North America: https://www.arcgis.com/home/
group.html?id=ddd06a0bde9c45a1b3e786a2b4e695e8#overview.
19To reduce the computation burden, we grouped the TAZs in each of the surrounding counties into 8
clusters of TAZs based on their locations using the K-Mean algorithm.
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Figure 1.2: A Travel Route with Stations Passed
Note: This figure represents the road network of a random location.
The driving time is less than 5 minutes.
Second, we further found the identities of the stations on each travel route and the
order of visits, by ranking driving distances of the stations to the origin TAZ in ascending
order. Figure 1.2 provides an example of a travel route connecting a start location A and
an end location B, including the three stations visited by drivers on this route. The set of
an ordered sequence of stations formalizes a search route. Because difference travel routes
may go through the same set of stations in the same order, we further collapse the travel
routes into a search route level. We obtained the empirical distribution of search routes by
summing up the predicted number of drivers driving past the same search route. We then
excluded search routes with fewer than 20 drivers traveling per day. As a result, a search
route abstracts from any travel time and distance and only contains two elements: (i) a
unique set of ordered sequence of stations, and (ii) the number of drivers passing through
it along with their demographics.20
Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics for the resulting travel routes and search
20Among the 47 stations, 2 stations entered the market at different times in the middle of our sample
period. We generate 796 search routes before any entry, 810 search routes after the first entry, and 841
search routes after both entries. In the structural estimation, the sample periods are divided into three parts
based on the date of entry and the empirical analysis is based on the empirical distribution of search routes
in each period respectively.
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routes. The median travel time of a travel route is 22 minutes, and a search route involves
5.3 stations and 289 drivers on average. In addition, the average percentage of drivers with
an annual income of more than $50,000 is 17.98 percent on a search route.21
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Travel Route and Search Route
count mean std 25% 50% 75%
Travel Routes
Total minutes 86099 29.80 22.99 13.00 22.12 38.42
Search Routes
N. stations 841 5.30 3.01 3.00 5.00 7.00
N. drivers 841 288.72 615.91 43.70 102.39 266.39
Income > 50k (%) 841 17.98 3.76 16.02 17.37 20.53
Note: Approximately 20 percent of the travel routes that have no stations are ex-
cluded.
Even though our data have many advantages, we discuss a few limitations. First,
only a limited number of stations are matched with transaction data. In the estimation,
although all stations’ quantities transacted are predicted by the model, identification is
based on the stations with quantity data observed. Due to the limited variation across
stations, we can only estimate a small number of station characteristics that contribute to
the vertical differentiation of stations. For this reason as well as to protect each retailer’s
identity, stations are broadly grouped into three categories: major-brand retailers, large-
format independent retailers, and other independent retailers.22 Second, the Origin and
Destination Table describes only the travel patterns of local drivers, and it does not include
information on the number of outside drivers traveling on the interstate highway, meaning
a large proportion of demand at the stations near the exits of the interstate highway is
not measured in our data. In addition, as these outside drivers do not observe gasoline
prices along their travel route (outside drivers have to deviate from their travel route, i.e.,
exit the highway, to sample prices), their purchase behavior is different from the focus of
21This number is calculated using the total population whose income is greater than $50,000 divided by
the total population in all origin and destination TAZs that comprise a search route.
22Major branded retailers are branded by the refinery companies that exclusively supply them gasoline.
Large-format independent retailers have large convenience stores and many pumps. Other independent
retailers are stations that do not have a large-format presence.
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this paper. To account for this issue, in our estimation, we use a dummy for each of the
stations located at the exit of the interstate highway to adjust for the difference between
the quantity predicted in the model and the quantity observed for these stations.
1.3 Retail Gasoline Market Overview
Before introducing the structural model, it is valuable to discuss the features in the
retail gasoline market that motivate our modeling choice. More specifically, we first examine
the relationship between the average transaction volumes of the stations and their price
reputation and location. Then, we discuss the sources that result in consumers’ imperfect
price information and highlight that a search with learning model is more appropriate for
formalizing consumers’ behavior than the standard consumer price search model in this
market.
1.3.1 Relationship Between Average Station Transaction Volume and
Station Characteristics
Table 1.3 describes the distribution of the station average price for all 47 stations in
the city and the distribution of the station average quantity transacted for the 35 stations
with matching gasoline transaction data over the sample period. The first two rows present
the characteristics of all stations in the city. The average gasoline price in our sample is
$1.97 per gallon, while the average volume transacted at a station is slightly below 1000
gallons per day. The interquartile range of the station average price is 10 cents per gallon,
accounting for approximately 5 percent of the average price.23 In contrast, considerable
heterogeneity is found in the average quantity transacted across stations, with the station
at the third quartile being six times the size of the station at the first quartile. The remaining
four rows show the distribution for the large-format independent and the major-branded
retailers. Comparing the distribution of the stations in each of the two categories with
23Interquartile range is calculated by the difference between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile.
12
the distribution of all stations in the city, respectively, we can see that there is a negative
correlation between stations’ average price and average transaction volume, consistent with
consumers preferring stations that tend to have lower prices. All large-format independents
in our sample have average prices in the lowest quartile, while their quantity transacted is in
the highest quartile. On the other hand, the average prices for all the majors are dispersed
in the upper three quartiles, with their sales in the lower three quartiles.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Station Average Price and Quantity Transacted
count mean std 25% 50% 75%
All Gasoline Stations
St. avg. price ($) 47 1.97 0.07 1.93 1.94 2.03
St. avg. quantity (gl.) 35 958.87 1173.29 240.19 375.05 1428.15
Large-format Independent Retailers
St. avg. price ($) 5 1.93 0.01 1.93 1.93 1.93
St. avg. quantity (gl.) 5 2699.12 1677.34 2063.04 2224.84 2239.03
Major Branded Retailers
St. avg. price ($) 17 2.02 0.06 1.96 2.03 2.06
St. avg. quantity (gl.) 13 392.26 423.76 120.77 293.09 375.05
In addition to a negative relationship between the average price and the average
transaction volume of the stations, Figure 1.3 depicts a positive correlation between the
daily traffic volume and the average transaction volume at a station, both measured in log-
arithms.24 As this figure suggests, as more drivers pass a station, the sampling probability
of this station is higher, which, in turn, leads to higher sales. This positive relationship
also confirms the advantage of using traffic data to simulate consumers’ search patterns for
gas stations over the assumption of random sampling with equal probability. The latter
assumption, which is a simplification widely adopted by empirical literature on consumer
search when individual search histories and quantity data are not observed (e.g., Hong and
Shum 2006; Wildenbeest 2011; and Nishida and Remer 2018), implies that when prod-
24One outlier station is excluded from the figure. This station is in a remote area by a lake with a high
sales volume, perhaps resulting from the high demand for gas for boats. This is outside the scope of the
paper. The average sales volume of this station is controlled for in the structural estimation.
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ucts are homogeneous and sampled with equal probability, the average sales volumes across
stations are expected to be the same. It is also important to notice that the relationship
between traffic and transaction volume is positive but not perfectly linear, indicating that
additional attributes of stations also matter, such as, price reputation and brand quality,
among others.
Figure 1.3: Sales Volume and Traffic Volume
Note: The slope of the linear fitted line is 1.28, significant at 5 percent
level.
Consumers also pass enough stations to allow them to search without deviating
from their travel route as we will assume in the structural model. Figure 1.4 shows the
distribution of the number of stations on drivers’ travel routes. More than 50 percent of
drivers pass at least three gasoline stations on their trips. The average number of stations
passed by a driver is 3.57, a number larger than that searched by consumers before buying
an MP3 player or a book from online retailers.25
25Using data on individual online browsing and purchase histories, De los Santos et al. (2017) find
consumers visit on average 2.82 online retailers before buying an MP3 player, and De los Santos (2018) finds
consumers searched 1.3 online bookstores before purchasing a book.
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Figure 1.4: Share of Drivers By the Number of Gas Stations on Travel Route
1.3.2 Two Types of Uncertainty
Frequent price changes in the retail gasoline market make it difficult for consumers
to maintain accurate price information. Figure 1.5 shows that the distribution of the pro-
portion of stations that change their price from the previous day. On an average day, about
30 percent of stations in the sample change their price at least once,26 resulting in two
types of uncertainty in the market: (i) ex-ante uncertainty about the price at each station,
and (ii) uncertainty about the probability distribution of all stations’ prices. To further
analyze the different sources contributing to these two types of uncertainty, we perform the
following basic fixed effect regression,
pj,t =
J∑
j=1
ψjStationj +
T∑
t=2
φtDayt + νj,t, (1.1)
where price at station j on day t, pj,t, is a combination of the station fixed effect, ψj ,
day-of-sample fixed effect, φt, and an idiosyncratic error term, νj,t.
Not all of the price components cause uncertainty. The average price differences
26This number is only a conservative measure of the proportion of stations changing their prices on a day,
due to the existence of missing prices. It is likely that price changes happen, but the data did not record
them.
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Figure 1.5: Proportion of Stations Changing Price From Previous Day
across stations, as measured by the differences in station fixed effects (ψj), are probably
perceived by consumers. As they repeatedly observe the prices of a number of stations
during their everyday driving, they tend to know the identity of higher and lower priced
stations on their travel route.
After subtracting the persistent price differences across stations from the observed
prices, we obtain the time variant components of the prices. We define time-variant price,
p˜j,t = φt + νj,t, as a combination of the day-of-sample fixed effect (φt), which is driven by
changes in market conditions (for example, wholesale cost) common to all stations, and the
price residual (νj,t), which is a result of the private shock (for example, private cost shocks)
specific to a certain station from day to day.27
These two components contribute to uncertainty in the market in different ways.
First, variation in the price residual (νj,t) causes station prices to fluctuate relative to one
another (e.g. Lewis 2008). More specifically, station specific shocks might result in a lower
priced station having a higher price than a higher priced station on a nontrivial number
of days (e.g., Chandra and Tappata 2011 find that this situation occurs approximately 15
percent of the time). Consequently, price residuals create the first type of uncertainty by
27Some search literature consider price residual as a result of firms employing mixed strategy. This paper
assumes pure strategy equilibria similar to Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004).
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preventing consumers from knowing a station’s location in the price distribution prior to
search. Price residuals, which reflect the true price differences across stations that are ex-
ante unknown to consumers on a day, are the focus of most of the empirical papers that
structurally estimate models of consumer search. These studies typically assume that con-
sumers know the distribution of price residuals. In particular, market conditions (reflected
in φt) are either assumed to be constant over time (e.g., Hong and Shum 2006; Wildenbeest
2011; etc.), or the changes are assumed to be known to consumers (e.g., Nishida and Remer
2018 recover estimates of search costs in the gasoline market assuming that consumers know
φt).
Table 1.4 summarizes the dispersion of price residuals. The size of the residual price
differences across stations, which are ex-ante unknown to consumers on a single day, shows
the potential gains when searching for lower prices. Daily price dispersion is calculated
by the standard deviation and the range (max minus min) of the price residuals across
stations within a day. The first two rows of Table 1.4 report the city-wide result. On an
average day, the standard deviation and range of the price residuals are 0.066 and 0.251
dollars, respectively. However, not all of the stations in the city are easily accessible to
each consumer. The dispersion of price residuals of stations along a travel route gives a
better picture of the gains of searching that can be exploited by consumers driving on that
route. The last two rows present the price dispersion on the search route and at the day
level.28 The average ex-ante unknown price difference across stations on a search route on a
day measured in standard deviation (range) equals 0.024 (0.055) dollars. Thus, on average,
an individual can realize a maximum gain of 5.5 cents per gallon of gasoline purchase by
searching the stations on her travel route.
The second component of price variation and uncertainty, which results from chang-
ing market conditions as measured by φt, is a critical feature in the retail gasoline market,
and it creates the second type of uncertainty. As shown by Figure 1.1, the daily distribution
of prices fluctuates frequently and significantly in response to wholesale cost changes. It
28The calculation is based on search route-day that has at least two price observations.
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Table 1.4: Daily Dispersion of Price Residuals ($/gal)
mean median min max N. obs.
In City
Standard deviation 0.032 0.032 0.013 0.069 535
Range 0.158 0.147 0.052 0.455 535
On Route
Standard deviation 0.024 0.019 0.000 0.292 402516
Range 0.055 0.044 0.000 0.455 402516
is unlikely that consumers know the current distribution of time-variant prices with any
degree of certainty.
Consumers’ best guess of the distribution of prices today is likely to be based on
the prices observed from past trips. Therefore, we assume in the structural model that
consumers formulate their prior belief of price distribution on prices they observed while
driving in the past. As consumers observe new price, they Bayesian update their prior
belief based on the newly acquired price information. The update is not perfect, however,
because consumers do not know why prices are changing. When the price observed at a
station today is higher than the previous day, consumers do not know if this new price is
specific to this station or it reflects changes in the market condition that are common to
all stations. The extent to which consumers’ prior beliefs of the current price distribution
are updated depends on how much a price observed at a station reflects the change in the
market condition. For instance, if consumers believe this price change is specific to this
station, then they do not adjust their beliefs about the prices at other stations. If, on the
other hand, they believe that this price change is common to all stations, then they will
adjust their beliefs about the prices at the other stations. In addition, since consumers
observe only a limited number of new prices on their travel route, their information about
the current price distribution is incomplete. As a result, consumers’ prior beliefs always
impact beliefs about the current price distribution, but the weight placed on these priors
decreases as more new information is obtained.
An imperfect knowledge of the price distribution can have important effects on
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consumer behavior. For example, this lack of information explains the commonly observed
pattern of asymmetric price response to cost changes where cost increases are passed through
more quickly than cost decreases, as depicted in Figure 1.1. Lewis (2011) argues that when
cost increases push up prices, consumers’ beliefs of the price distribution may be lower than
the actual price distribution, causing consumers to increase their search. As a result, price
margins go down. On the other hand, when costs and prices fall, the current prices may
be lower than consumers expected, meaning they search less, which leads to higher profit
margins.
The behaviors of the equilibrium prices are consistent with the implication of a
model of consumer search with learning. In the following sections, we propose a model
of consumer search with learning, and we then apply the model to data and structurally
estimate how consumers form their believes.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Utility
Demand for gasoline is characterized by consumers searching for it from gas stations
on their travel routes. We consider a city containing a set, J, of J stations indexed j =
1, 2, ..., J . We assume that consumer each demands 10 gallons of gasoline and all share a
common utility function. Consumer’s indirect utility for gasoline at station j on day t is
equal to
uj,t = Xjβ − pj,t,
where Xj represents station j’s non-priced characteristics, and pj,t is the unit cost of gasoline
(per gallon price observed multiplied by 10 gallons) at gas station j on day t. Note that
the coefficient on the price is normalized to -1, so utilities are expressed in terms of dollar
values.
Based on the decomposition of prices in Equation 1.1, pj,t = ψj + φt + νj,t, we can
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rewrite consumer’s indirect utility as
uj,t = Xjβ − γψj − φt − νj,t
= Vj − p˜j,t, (1.2)
where ψj is station j’s average price, φt represents the day-to-day changes in the city average
price, and νj,t is the idiosyncratic deviation of station j’s price on day t from its own average
and the city average. We further partition utility into Vj = Xjβ − γψj , which measures
the value of station j’s time invariant characteristics, and a time-varying price component
p˜j,t = φt + νj,t. We use ψj as a measure of a station’s reputation of being a high or low
priced station, and we allow consumers to respond to the differences in price reputation
across stations separately from changes in time-variant prices. The difference in response
is measured by γ − 1.
The partition of the utility function is motivated by the features of the retail gasoline
market. Repeated observations of a number of stations and frequent purchases of gasoline
at these stations allow consumers to become aware of the characteristics of stations that are
constant over time, such as the location, brand, and price reputation. Vj then represents
the part of utility known to consumers prior to search. In contrast, time-variant prices,
representing the changes in prices over time and across stations, are unknown to consumers,
as discussed in the previous section.
Our approach allowing for ex-ante differentiation of products relaxes the assumption
adopted by papers on search using market level data that products are ex-ante homogeneous
(e.g. Hortac¸su and Syverson 2004). Kim et al. (2010) and Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2015)
allow ex-ante differentiation of products, however, in their papers the sampling process is
endogenous. In particular, consumers search the alternatives that yield the highest expected
utilities first based on the characteristics observed. In our model, the search order of stations
is exogenous as it is predetermined by consumers’ travel routes.
As consumers drive along their travel route, they observe prices to realize the time-
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variant price at each station. Consumers then Bayesian update their belief of the current
distribution of time-variant prices with each newly observed price. In the following section,
we detail the consumer learning process.
1.4.2 Consumer Learning
Let ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρH) be a set of all possible values of time-variant prices. These
values are sorted in increasing order, with ρ1 being the lowest possible value and ρH being
the highest. The probability of sampling each value is given by a vector pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., piH).
Consumers consider these probabilities to be random variables that are distributed accord-
ing to a Dirichlet distribution, following Rothschild (1974), Koulayev (2013) and De los
Santos et al. (2017). We assume consumers’ prior beliefs for the probabilities follows
f(pi|a) = Γ(
∑H
h=1 ah)∏H
h=1 Γ(ah)
H∏
h=1
pih
ah−1,
∑
pih = 1, pih > 0, (1.3)
where Γ is the gamma function and a = (a1, a2, aH) is a vector of concentration
parameters, which can be re-written as a = αω, where ω is a vector of the expected value
of the probabilities of prior beliefs
ω = E(pi|a) = (a1
α
,
a2
α
, ...,
aH
α
), α =
∑
ah, ah > 0, (1.4)
and α is a scale that is often interpreted as the weight on the initial prior belief (prior
sample size). The ratio ah/α represents the expected likelihood of value ρh being sampled.
The prior belief is updated as consumers observe each price on their travel route.
Since the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution, the
posterior distribution will be Dirichlet as well. Let sk be the set of k stations that consumers
observe on their travel route. Nsk = (n1, n2, ..., nH) then represents the number of times
each time-variant price has been sampled during the search of k stations. The posterior
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expected value of the sampling probabilities is
E(pi|αω,Nsk) = (
a1 + n1
α+
∑
nh
,
a2 + n2
α+
∑
nh
, ...,
aH + nH
α+
∑
nh
). (1.5)
Consumers’ posterior beliefs of the price distribution depends on three aspects, the
shape of the prior belief, presented by ω; its weight presented by α; and the newly obtained
information, Nsk . According to the learning process, the expected likelihood of observing
ρh,
ah+nh
α+
∑H
h nh
, increases every time it is observed. The speed of consumer belief updates is
inversely related to α. More specifically, the more confident consumers are in their prior
beliefs, the larger the α and the slower the beliefs are updated with each new observation.
As more prices are sampled from the current distribution, the posterior belief converges to
the actual price distribution.
1.4.3 Ordered Search
Consumers are assumed to search the stations along their travel route. In practice,
drivers commonly encounter plenty of options without having to go out of their way. The
average driver in our data observes 3.57 stations on her travel route. Therefore, any devi-
ation from the travel route, including recall (driving back to a previously passed station)
is assumed to be too costly. As a result, consumers’ search of gasoline stations is sequen-
tial and ordered, as they know ex-ante the predetermined order of visits of differentiated
stations. In this section, we discuss how a consumer makes a decision to purchase gasoline
along the route. Then in the following section, we aggregate all driver decisions to obtain
the total volume of gasoline transacted at a station.
A search route s is defined as a set of sequentially ordered stations that a consumer
will drive past on her trip, with S as the set of all search routes. At each station on the
search route, a consumer updates her belief of the price distribution with each new price
observed before deciding whether to purchase gasoline at this station or go to the next one.
As the travel route is predetermined, observing the price of the next station is assumed to
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be costless. The consumer maximizes her utility of a gasoline purchase by comparing the
realized utility at each station with the expected value of the remaining options, which is
characterized as reservation utility.
Let there be K stations, with k representing the location of consumer i on search
route s, and k = 1 being the first station and k = K the last. Let s(k) return the station
index j for the kth element in s, with s(k) ∈ J.
Consumer i’s decision at the kth station can be formalized as follows. We begin by
dividing the search route into two parts, sk ∪ s¯k, with sk being the set of stations already
visited by consumer i, and s¯k containing the remaining stations on the route. Then, based
on the Equation 1.5, her belief about the current distribution of time-variant price after
observing prices at the first k stations is E(pi|αω,Nsk). Conditional on her belief, she
derives the reservation utility at the current kth station using backward induction from the
outside option.
If she does not buy from the final station, she is allowed the alternative of waiting
to purchase gasoline on a future trip. However, she needs to pay a cost of postponing
purchase ci to access the alternative. This ci will be higher for those running out of gas
or who need to purchase now for some other reasons, and lower for those who are seeking
to purchase gas but not under pressure to do so immediately. Based on the observation
that a driver regularly travel different routes on different occasions, the outside option is
simplified as sampling a station randomly from the set of all stations, J. Denote Zx(·) as
the reservation utility that represents the expected value of having x stations remaining on
the route. Thus, at the last station where there are no stations remaining, the reservation
utility Z0(αω,Nsk ,V∅,VJ, ci) solves the following equation,
ci =
J∑
j=1
λj
∑
ρh<Vj−Z0
(Vj − ρh − Z0)E(pih|αω,Nsk), (1.6)
where λj is the probability of sampling station j on future trips, V∅ is a vector of the
values of the station attributes remaining on the route, and VJ is a vector of values of
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station attributes outside of the route. Later in the empirical exercise, we assume equal
probability of sampling a station on an individual’s future trips, λj = 1/J . The right hand
side of Equation 1.6 describes the expected gains of choosing to buy gasoline during future
trips, if the utility at the last station is at Z0. By equating expected gains with the cost of
postponing purchase ci, Z0 summarizes the expected value of the outside option, conditional
on the driver’s belief at the kth station. Thus, if the realized utility at the last station is
higher than Z0, the cost of postponing purchase is higher than the expected gain from
postponement, and the driver will make a purchase at the final station, and vice versa.
The calculation of reservation utility at the second to last station is then
Z1(αω,Nsk ,Vs¯K−1 ,VJ, ci) =
∑
h
max{Z0, Vs(K) − ρh}E(pih|αω,Nsk),
= Z0 +
∑
ρh<Vs(K)−Z0
(Vs(K) − ρh − Z0)E(pih|αω,Nsk). (1.7)
Equation 1.7 shows that at the final station (Kth) station, consumer i will make a purchase
only if the realized utility is greater than the reservation utility us(K) = Vs(K) − p˜s(K) >
Z0(αω,Nsk ,V∅,VJ, ci), conditional on her belief at the kth station; otherwise, she will
choose the outside option Z0. Therefore, the reservation utility at the second to last station,
Z1, is higher than the reservation utility at the last station Z0 by the amount of expected
gain from search at the last station.
As consumer i continues to backward solving this recursive relationship for reserva-
tion utility for each station from the end of the route to her current location, the reservation
utility at the kth station is
ZK−k(αω,Nsk ,Vs¯k ,VJ, ci)
=ZK−k−1 +
∑
ρh<Vs(k+1)−ZK−k−1
(Vs(k+1) − ρh − ZK−k−1)E(pih|αω,Nsk). (1.8)
The transition of the reservation utility at each station has the following properties.
Proposition 1 : Conditional on consumer i’s belief, reservation utility Zk decreases
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in ci for any k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1.
Proposition 2 : Conditional on consumer i’s belief, the reservation utility decreases
as the number of stations remaining on the route decreases. Zk ≤ Zk+1 for any k =
0, 1, ...,K − 1.
Figure 1.6 summarizes the two propositions. The three curves in the graph depict
the transition of the reservation utility as the number of stations remaining on the route
changes, given three different costs of postponing purchase, assuming that the consumers’
beliefs of the price distribution are uniformly distributed from 0 to 1 and stations are
homogeneous with attribute value V = 2. First, as the postponement cost is higher, the
value of purchase on future trips becomes lower, as shown by the curves when the number of
stations remaining is zero. Consequently, a higher postponement cost means drivers require
a lower threshold at all points along the route (Proposition 1 ). A driver who has an almost
empty gas tank is more likely to accept a lower utility (higher price) at any station along
her route than a driver who still has plenty of gas left in the tank. Second, as the number of
stations remaining on the route goes down, the reservation utility goes down (Proposition
2 ). More specifically, when consumers come to the end of their routes, they are more likely
to accept lower utilities (higher prices) as they have fewer options remaining. In addition,
Proposition 2 also suggests that, if there is a station with a high value of attributes on the
route, the reservation utility is higher at any station before that station, suggesting that a
driver will buy from a station only if the realized utility is higher than the expected utility
at any station remaining on the route.
We further illustrate how the distribution of the cost of postponing a purchase
determines the proportion of consumers who choose each option on the route. At the
kth station on the route, after realization of the utility uk and updating the belief of the
price distribution E(pi|αω,Nsk), we obtain the critical cutoff of postponement cost c∗k that
equates the reservation utility at the kth station with uk. Because ZK−k is a decreasing
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Figure 1.6: Transition of Reservation Utility
Note: This figure assumes that consumers’ belief of the price distribu-
tion follows a uniform distribution with support from 0 to 1. Stations
are homogeneous with attribute values equal to 2.
function in c, according to Proposition 1, its inverse is
c∗k = Z
−1
K−k(uk|αω,Nsk ,Vs¯k ,VJ). (1.9)
Therefore, consumers who have search cost c > c∗k will purchase at the kth station as the
realized utility uk is higher than the expected value of the remaining options, given that
they have not purchased from any previously visited stations. Let G denote the distribution
of the postponement costs ci for consumers who drive on route s. Then the proportion of
consumers who purchase from the kth station on the route is
qk =

G(c∗∗k )−G(c∗k) if c∗∗k > c∗k
0 otherwise,
(1.10)
where c∗∗k = min{c∗g for any g < k}. As consumers with a cost of postponing purchase
higher than c∗∗k would have already bought from a station before the kth station, only when
c∗∗k > c
∗
k, would the kth station have positive gasoline sales on that particular search route.
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This concludes the formalization of the individual level purchase decision as a result
of searching and leaning on each search route. In the next section, we explain the aggregation
from individual to station level, and the use of daily price and quantity data at each station,
combined with traffic data for estimating the model.
1.5 Estimation
Our general estimation approach is as follows. We begin by aggregating a station’s
share of sales, as described in Equation 1.10, across all routes the station is on to obtain
the model predicted share of sales at the market level, which is the level of observation of
our quantity data.
The observed market share of station, j, on day, t, Qj,t, is defined as the share
of total drivers who purchase gas at the station on that day. The number of drivers who
purchase at a station is measured by the observed daily quantity of gasoline transacted
at the station divided by 10 gallons, based on the assumption that a driver only buys 10
gallons of gas at each purchase, while the total number of drivers are obtained from the
traffic data.29
Since the majority of drivers on a search route have fairly full tanks and are unlikely
to even consider purchasing gas, we allow cost of postponing purchase till a future trip
to have a probability mass of 1 − ηt at zero. These drivers never purchase because their
expected value of future purchase, Z0, equals the highest utility (lowest price) possible
from a gasoline purchase. The remaining ηt share of drivers have a positive probability
of purchasing gasoline on their search routes. Note that ηt is allowed to vary over time to
account for the changes in overall demand (frequency of purchase) for gasoline. For example,
during summer seasons drivers purchase more frequently, meaning the proportion of drivers
with a positive probability of purchasing gasoline also goes up. We assume consumers’ costs
for postponing purchase follow a log-normal distribution and associate these costs to the
29A unit of gasoline purchase of 10 gallons is a scaler chosen for the convenience of interpreting the
estimation results.
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demographics of drivers who drive along a search route as follows,
lnci,s = C + µcYS + ζ
c
i , (1.11)
where C is a constant, YS is the measures of the demographics of drivers on a route, including
the proportion of drivers with incomes greater than $50,000 dollars, and a stochastic term
ζci that follows N(0, σ
2
c ) that is common to all routes. Therefore, Equation 1.10, which
describes the share of drivers on search route s who purchase from the kth station, can be
rewritten as
qk|s =

ηt(Φ(
lnc∗∗k − C − µcYS
σc
)− Φ(
lnc∗k − C − µcYS
σc
)) if c∗∗k > c
∗
k
0 otherwise,
(1.12)
where Φ(·) is standard normal CDF. Let s−1(j) returns the location index k of station j on
s. The share of total drivers who buy from station j at time t is,
Qˆj,t(θ) =
1∑
s∈SWS
∑
s∈S
qs−1(j)|s,tWS1(j ∈ s), (1.13)
where Ws is the number of drivers on route s obtained from the traffic data. The set of
parameters to be estimated is given by θ = (α, β, γ, C, µc, σc, ηt), where α is the weight
on consumers’ prior beliefs, β is the value of station attributes such as brand, γ is the
sensitivity to price reputation, and C, µc and σc determine the shape of the postponement
cost distribution.
Next, we assume that the model predicted market share differs from its observed
value at each station by a additive independent normal error, j,t = Qj,t − Qˆj,t(θ), with
j,t ∼ N(0, σ), and subsequently construct the likelihood function to be maximized as
follows, ∏
t
∏
j
1
√
2piσ2
e−
(Qj,t−Qˆj,t(θ))2
2σ2 . (1.14)
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The error term j,t represents an aggregate level measurement (prediction) error,
similar to Bresnahan (1987), Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004), Kim et al. (2010), etc. Several
sources can lead to measurement error. First, inaccuracy of the gasoline prices and the
imputation of missing prices can directly cause measurement error in the observed market
share at a station since the quantity of gasoline transacted at a station is calculated by
dividing the total value of transactions by the price. Second, the model predicted market
shares are based on the estimated daily average traffic flows that do not reflect temporary
road repair or congestion. True daily market shares may be influenced by such temporary
changes.
Consumers’ prior beliefs about the price distribution on day t before observing
any prices on their search route is assumed to be a result of continuous learning of the
price distribution based on the observed prices on past trips, with older price observations
discounted more heavily. Consumers are assumed to have a homogeneous prior belief and
updating process, described as follows,
ωt = E(pi|αωt−1,Nt−1,J/J), (1.15)
where ωt−1 is consumers’ prior beliefs on day t − 1, and Nt−1,J/J is the vector of the
number of times each price is being observed in the city on day t − 1 divided by the total
number of prices observed, which is also the empirical density distribution of the city price
distribution. One can think of this process as an exponential moving average of the city
price distribution. As discussed in Section 1.3, because consumer information about price
distribution on any given day is imperfect and incomplete, the prices observed in the past
always carry some weight in the consumers’ beliefs. This weight, measured by α, governs
the speed of the learning process.
Identification of the different parameters in the model relies on different sources of
variation. First, consumer preferences, β and γ, for product attributes, including brand
and price reputation, are identified by observed variation in average market shares across
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stations. Second, the parameters, C, µc and σc that govern the distribution of the costs
of postponing purchase are identified by (i) how observed variation in market share is
related to the variation in station average utilities (normalized to dollars) across stations,
conditional on the variation in the number of drivers who go past each station and (ii) how
variation in a station’s market share over time relates to changes in day-to-day prices. More
specifically, the first variation shows how likely it is for drivers assigned to a route with bad
stations (those with high price reputations) to postpone purchase until they are assigned a
route with better options on average, while the second variation represents intertemporal
substitution reflected in a station’s market share. Third, the weight on the prior belief α is
identified by the variation of the difference between consumers’ prior beliefs and the current
price distribution over time.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimated parameters are shown in Table 1.5. The parameter estimate of the
weight on the prior belief of the price distribution is 5.31. More specifically, consumers’
initial prior belief, which is formulated by past price observations during everyday driving,
is as informative about the current price distribution as if consumers had already observed
approximately five prices today. When less weight is placed on prior beliefs, consumers
update their beliefs more quickly with each new price observation. For example, if an
individual believes that the average price today is $2.00, a prior weight of 5 suggests that
if she observes a price of $2.12, she will update her belief of the average price to $2.02.
However, if the prior weight is 11, her posterior belief of the average price is $2.01. It
is important to note that consumers do not update their belief of the expected price to
be equal to the price observed at a particular station because they do not know whether
the change is specific to this station or is common to all stations. The estimated rate of
updating is much faster than what is generally assumed by literature. In the two empirical
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papers that apply models of search with learning (Koulayev 2013 and De los Santos et al.
2017), the weight on the prior belief is not estimated but rather chosen by the researchers
to be the number of product-retailer combinations. This results in a much higher weight on
the prior. (For example, Koulayev 2013 set α to be ranging from 24 to 82). Our estimate of
a relatively fast learning process is consistent with the fact that the distribution of gasoline
prices changes regularly in response to wholesale cost volatility. As a result, past price
observations carry only limited information, while prices sampled today are much more
informative about the current distribution of prices.
Table 1.5: Estimation Results
Coeff. Std. Err.
Learning
Prior Weight (α) 5.3055 (1.4703)
Seller Attributes
Price Reputation (γ) -1.7872 (0.3093)
Majors (β) -0.2419 (0.1749)
Large-format Independents (β) 2.1853 (0.1429)
Log of Postponement Cost
Constant (C) -2.7456 (0.1936)
Income > 50k (µc) 0.0773 (0.0801)
SD (σc) 4.8452 (0.2194)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. The
coefficient estimates are for an one time purchase of 10 gallons of
gasoline. Day of sample fixed effects and month of sample fixed
effects are included in ηt to capture the change in the daily overall
demand for gasoline. Estimates of ηt are not reported.
The estimated value of station attributes, which are ex-ante known to consumers,
are compared to their response to day-to-day price changes, which are unknown prior to
search. More specifically, the coefficient on the known and the persistent price reputation
across stations is estimated to be -1.79, a value significantly different from -1, the response to
time-variant price changes. This suggests that when consumers are driving, they are likely
to postpone gasoline purchase until they reach a station that tends to be less expensive even
if it means forgoing lower prices offered by a station that tends to be more expensive. If a
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station’s price goes up by two cents (approximately 1 percent of average gasoline price, $1.97,
in the sample) in a day, which is ex-ante unknown to consumers and only revealed to those
who drive by this station, it would see an average decrease in market share of 9.49 percent.
On the other hand, if a station increases its persistent price reputation by two cents, which
is known to all consumers ex-ante, an average station would experience a 24.65 percent
drop in its market share. Table 1.6 summaries the results. This large difference in the
change in market share is driven by the fact that consumers are almost twice as responsive
to a change in price reputation than to a change in time-variant price. In addition, change
in price reputation results in an ax-ante change in consumers’ purchase probability at the
station, while a time-variant change results only in a change in the purchase probability
ex-post.
Table 1.6: Average Percentage Change in a Station’s Market Share
Under Two Types of Price Change
mean std 25% 50% 75%
Transitory Price (%) -9.49 7.41 -11.56 -7.78 -4.85
Price Reputation (%) -24.65 17.00 -31.79 -22.20 -11.07
Note: The stations near the interstate highway and the lake are excluded from
the calculation.
The coefficient on the major-branded retailers is negative, however not significantly
different from zero, which is the mean value of the other independent retailers. This result
does not provide evidence that consumers are willing to pay a premium for branded gasoline.
However, consumers are willing to pay about $2.19 premium for 10 gallons of gas at the
large-format independent retailers, probably because they have standardized and consistent
amenities, with large islands, plenty of pumps, and large, clean convenience stores, as well as
a brand image of having a low price, in addition to their individual station price reputations.
Based on the postponement cost estimates, for drivers who have a positive proba-
bility of purchasing gasoline, the median cost of postponing purchase to a future trip is 6.4
cents per 10 gallons purchased, and 25 percent of these drivers have postponement costs
higher than $2.09. Figure 1.7 depicts the estimated postponement cost CDF. These num-
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bers indicate that the majority of drivers start seeking gasoline well in advance of their tank
being empty. As they do not act as if they are pressured to buy gas immediately, they can
postpone their purchase until they drive on a route with low priced stations. However, ap-
proximately 25 percent of the drivers seeking gasoline are willing to pay 20 cents per gallon
more to purchase gasoline on the current route, due, for example, to an almost empty gas
tank. Although the coefficient on income is positive, it is not statistically nor economically
different from zero. One would expect stations on routes with a higher proportion of high-
income drivers to have higher sales volumes even if prices are higher because such drivers
are less price sensitive and have higher postponement costs. However, this expectation is
not supported by the data, perhaps because the variation in the proportion of residents
with annual income higher than $50,000 across traffic zones is too small for identification
(the standard deviation is 3.76 percentage points).
Figure 1.7: CDF of the Cost of Postponing Purchase
1.6.2 Cross-Price Elasticities
In this subsection, we evaluate the importance of spatial differentiation in explaining
substitution patterns across stations by analyzing the impact of the distance and the number
of common drivers shared between stations on the estimated elasticity of substitution. Based
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on the parameter estimates shown in Table 1.5, we obtain the estimated cross-price elasticity
for a pair of stations by calculating the percentage change in target station i’s market
share due to an ex-ante unknown one percent increase in the price of the other station, j,
εi,j = %∆Qˆi/%∆pj . Given that a majority of station pairs have virtually zero elasticities
(it is not surprising that two stations located at the opposite ends of the city do not compete
closely against each other as they do not share much common traffic), this analysis focuses
only on pairs of stations with a cross-price elasticity greater than 0.01, a value exhibited by
less than 20 percent of the total possible station pairs.
Table 1.7 summaries the distribution of the estimated cross-price elasticities and
two measures of spatial differentiation between stations. We can see that even after the
exclusion of station pairs that do not compete closely against each other, the distribution
of cross-price elasticities is right-skewed. The average cross elasticity is 1.73, with only 10
percent of the pairs having a cross elasticity greater than 2.16. In our restricted sample,
the average common traffic share between two stations, which is defined as the proportion
of the target station i’s traffic that also goes past station j, is 24 percent, and the average
driving distance is 3.36 miles.
Table 1.7: Summary Statistics of Elasticity of Substitution and Measures of Spatial
Differentiation Between Stations
count mean std min 10% 50% 90% max
Cross Price Elasticity 284.0 1.73 8.85 0.01 0.02 0.15 2.16 127.91
Share of Common Traffic 284.0 0.24 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.72 1.00
Driving Distance (miles) 284.0 3.36 2.08 0.05 0.91 3.11 6.28 10.51
Note: This table includes only station pairs with a cross-price elasticity greater than 0.01, a value
exhibited by fewer than 20 percent of the total station pairs.
Table 1.8 reports the results of a regression of the logarithm of the estimated cross-
price elasticity on the measures of the spatial differentiation of station pairs. As expected,
these regression results indicate that cross-price elasticity between two stations increases
in the proportion of common traffic and declines as the driving distance between them
increases. A comparison of the results in Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the proportion of
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Table 1.8: Regression Results of Estimated Elasticity of Substi-
tution on Measures of Spatial Differentiation Between Stations
ln(εˆi,j)
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.6585** -0.0166 0.0546
(0.2451) (0.2237) (0.2426)
ln(Distance)ij -1.0342*** -0.3803**
(0.1585) (0.1419)
ln(CommonTraffic)ij 0.6977*** 0.5730***
(0.0667) (0.0647)
N 284 284 284
R2 0.22 0.35 0.37
Note: Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the target
station level. CommonTrafficij measures the proportion of station i’s
traffic that also goes past station j. ***, **, and * represent significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
common traffic explains a more significant fraction of the variation in substitution patterns
between stations (35 percent) than driving distance. Based on the coefficient estimates in
Column (3), holding the driving distance between the two stations constant, a doubling of
the common traffic share will increase the elasticity of substitution by 57 percent.
1.7 Counterfactual
In this section, we study the value of price information to consumers using our
estimated demand system. More specifically, we calculate the net change in consumers’
surplus after stepwise removal of two types of information uncertainty, (i) uncertainty about
the price distribution, and (ii) uncertainty about the price at each station. To do so, we
simulate consumers’ purchase decisions and compute the aggregated value of these choices
across hypothetical cases with different amounts of information uncertainty, while holding
the supply side constant.
We begin our analysis with the current state in the presence of both types of uncer-
tainty. The total value for all consumers seeking gasoline on day t under dual uncertainty,
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TVdu,t is calculated as,
TVdu,t =
∑
s∈S
ηtWs
∑
k∈s
uk,tqk(αωt,Nsk,t) +
∑
s∈S
ηtWs
∑
k∈s
∫ c∗∗du,s
0
Z0(c|ft)g(c)dc. (1.16)
∑
s∈S ηtWs
∑
k∈s uk,tqk(αωt,Nsk,t) measures the total realized utility for consumers who
have made the purchase decision conditional on their beliefs at each station on each search
route, and
∑
s∈S ηtWs
∑
k∈s
∫ c∗∗s
0 Z0(c|ft)g(c)dc computes the total expected value for con-
sumers who have chosen to postpone their purchases to future trips, where Z0(c|ft) is the
value of the outside option evaluated at the current price distribution measured by the
empirical price distribution, ft. c
∗∗
du,st = min{c∗du,k for all k ∈ s} is the critical cut-off post-
ponement cost on search route s under both types of uncertainty, with consumers whose
c > c∗∗du,st choosing to purchase on the route, and consumers whose c ≤ c∗∗du,st choosing to
postpone purchase to future trips, and c∗du,k, solved by Equation 1.9, is the critical cut-off
postponement cost for each station on the route, conditional on consumers’ beliefs.
The resulting inefficiencies that occur to consumers under both types of uncertainty
are illustrated by the following situations. First, when prices decline, the observed prices
are likely to be lower than consumers’ beliefs about them. As a result, some consumers may
choose to purchase gas immediately at an early station on a route, forgoing options later
in the route or future trips that may generate larger savings. Second, when prices increase,
the observed prices are likely to be higher than consumer’s beliefs of prices. As a result,
some consumers may choose to continue searching for less expensive stations or postpone
their purchases, eventually having to settle down on more expensive options before learning
that the price increases are global.
To evaluate the magnitude of these inefficiencies caused by information uncertainty,
we calculate the total value for all consumers under the counterfactual scenario where there
is only price uncertainty and the consumers know the distribution of current prices. This
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assumption is the one typically adopted in the literature on consumer search,
TVpu,t =
∑
s∈S
ηtWs
∑
k∈s
uk,tqk(ft) +
∑
s∈S
ηtWs
∑
k∈s
∫ c∗∗pu,s
0
Z0(c|ft)g(c)dc, (1.17)
where c∗∗pu,s is the critical cut-off postponement cost for consumers who are indifferent to
purchasing on the current route or postponing their purchases.
Finally, we compute the total value for all consumers under the counterfactual sce-
nario where they know the current prices at all stations. Consequently, consumers choose
whether to buy from the station that provides the highest utility on a route or to postpone
their purchases to a future trip. The total value under perfect information is,
TVpi,t =
∑
s∈S
ηtWs
∑
k∈s
u∗st(1−G(c∗∗pi,s)) +
∑
s∈S
ηtWs
∑
k∈s
∫ c∗∗pi,s
0
Z0(c|ft)g(c)dc, (1.18)
where u∗st = max{ukt for all k ∈ s} and c∗∗pi,s is the critical cut-off postponement cost for
consumers who are indifferent between purchasing from the station with highest utility on
the route or postponing their purchases.
Based on our computation, we find that if consumers know about the current dis-
tribution of prices, their net surplus increases by an average of $210.30 on a day in the
city, calculated by 1T
∑T
t=1(TVpu,t − TVdu,t). This increased benefit is approximately 0.56
percent of the total value of transactions on a day in the city predicted by the model. It
is equivalent to an average of 1.12 cents in savings per gallon when consumers are fully
informed about the current price distribution.
Under the second counterfactual scenario, where consumers have perfect information
about today’s price offered by each station, their net surplus would increase by an average
of $299.90, which is equivalent to an average of 1.60 cents in savings per gallon. This
estimated benefit of reduced information uncertainty seems to be small compared to the
observed price dispersion in the city (summarized in Table 1.4) because our estimated
model takes into account the limited number of stations on consumers’ travel routes and
the costs of accessing more stations not on the current travel route. More specifically, the
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costs of postponing the purchase to future trips, independent of the amount of information
consumers have, prevent all consumers from purchasing at the cheapest station in the city, a
situation that would result in significant benefits of having perfect information. In addition,
the estimated benefit of information is net of the ex-ante known attributes of the stations,
including price reputation and brand qualities. As a result, our simulation predicts 90.42
percent of consumers who purchased gasoline on a route have done so from the station that
generates the highest utility, while 82.69 percent of consumers have bought from the station
with the lowest price under both types of uncertainty.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a model to study consumer behavior for searching for
the best offer while learning about the distribution of prices in the context of the retail
gasoline market. Using a novel panel dataset of daily station-level gasoline sales and prices,
combined with data on the empirical distribution of drivers, we estimated the parameters
that govern consumers’ learning, utility, and cost of substitution from current purchase to
future purchases. We are the first to estimate the learning process in a consumer search
framework. We found that consumers place a relatively high weight on newly observed
prices when formulating their beliefs of the overall price distribution, a founding consistent
with the observation that prices sampled today are more informative about the current
price distribution than past price observations in a market of volatile prices.
Our modeling framework has many important advantages. First, we model con-
sumers’ search sequences of gasoline stations based on their travel patterns. Consequently,
search sequences of stations are simulated based on the empirical distribution of traffic
flows, allowing us to estimate consumer search and learning behavior using only aggregated
station-level data. In addition, the model generates realistic substitution patterns that de-
pend on the amount of common traffic shared between two stations. Second, the model
allows for ax-ante vertical differentiation of stations and is not affected by dimensionality
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when integrating out individuals’ search histories. We find that consumers respond to the
ex-ante known differentiation of stations, including brand and price reputation by more
than the actual dollar amount of the price difference. Although we do not explicitly model
risk aversion in our framework, this result likely captures the value of a reduction in uncer-
tainty, which a station or a brand provides to consumers through a consistently lower price.
Third, we allow for uncertainty in consumers’ beliefs about the current price distribution.
Our counterfactual results suggest that information on the actual price distribution benefits
consumers by an amount that is equivalent to a 1.12 cents in savings per gallon of gasoline
purchased. On the other hand, perfect consumer information ex-ante about the price at
each station generates an average of 1.60 cents of savings per gallon. Although the suggested
benefit of reducing information uncertainty in the retail gasoline market seems small, it is
non-trivial. It is also important to note that this result is obtained after controlling for the
cost of substitution across spatially-differentiated stations, as well as the known average
price difference across stations. Analysis that fails to take into account these two factors,
for example if everyone buys from the lowest priced station in the city, would overestimate
the benefit of increasing the amount of information.
There are several avenues for further development of our model, the most important
being to model the supply side decision. By including the pricing decision of the stations, we
would be able to analyze the amount of equilibrium price dispersion in the retail gasoline
market caused by information uncertainty and spatial differentiation. In addition, our
modeling framework can be applied to multiple cities and be used to empirically analyze
the link between the speed of learning and the degree of asymmetric price response.
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Chapter 2
Bidding Behavior in A + B
Procurement Auctions: A
Laboratory Analysis of the Effect
of Complexity and Competition
(with Bernardo F. Quiroga and
Brent B. Moritz)
2.1 Introduction
A+B auctions (or scoring auctions) are widely applied to situations where attributes
other than price matter. In these auctions, bidders not only bid on price (the A dimen-
sion), but also on non-monetary attributes/quality (the B dimension). Each component of
a bid is evaluated based on a scoring rule, and the bidder achieving the best score wins the
auction. The non-monetary dimension usually includes delivery time and any other mea-
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surable quality attributes that endogenously impact the outcome of an auction as assessed
by the scoring design. These auctions are common in public procurement. For example,
the Department of Transportation often adopts A+B auctions to give contractors bidding
on highway construction projects an explicit incentive for accelerated completion when the
cost of delay for commuters is substantial (e.g. Lewis and Bajari 2011). The Department
of Defense depends on scoring auctions to procure weapons systems where the non-price
attributes (quality of the goods) are critical (e.g. Che 1993). The use of scoring auctions
is widespread in the private sector as well. Online platforms, for instance, select the ads
with the best price bid and the most relevant content (quality) to display to their users. A
scoring algorithm that aims to increase both advertisement revenue and user experience is
employed to determine which advertiser wins placement on the platform.
Several researchers have studied the theoretical properties of A+B auctions (e.g.
Che 1993; Branco 1997; Asker and Cantillon 2008; Lewis and Bajari 2011; Gupta et al.
2015). Asker and Cantillon (2008) found that the scoring mechanism dominates other com-
monly used procedures for bidding differentiated products from a theoretical perspective,
one example being the price-only auction with a minimum quality threshold. However, when
evaluating the performance of A+B auctions in practice, researchers might be concerned
about the bidders’ ability to submit bids that maximize their expected utility. Experimental
research by Cox et al. (1985, 1988) and many others has documented the difficulties that
bidders face in making optimal offers in sealed-bid-first-price auctions, even with simplifying
assumptions and price-only decisions. In the A+B auction setting, bidders not only have
to decide on the price to charge but they also need to choose the quality level to fulfill. It is
unclear if bidders are able to follow the optimal strategy suggested by standard auction the-
ory. The increased complexity of the procedure may introduce noise in the bidders’ decision
making and, in turn, limit the mechanism’s ability to realize the attractive properties, such
as the efficient allocation of resources. As documented by Quiroga et al. (2019), suppliers in
the laboratory show a substantial discrepancy between the theoretical prediction resulting
from standard theory in A+B auctions and the observed behavior of bidders.
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In this paper, we conduct an experiment similar to the A+B procurement auctions
adopted by government agencies in order to empirically study the performance of A+B
auction design. In this experimental setting, we examine how bidders react to the increased
complexity of the A+B mechanism and how their deviation from the Nash equilibrium
strategy impacts the outcome of the auctions and consequently, the performance of the
mechanism. In the field, it is usually difficult to investigate the bidder behavior with-
out imposing a series of strong rationality assumptions because of endogeneity (omitted
variables) and the private cost information usually unobserved by the econometrician. The
advantages of our experiment compared to field data are that bidders behave in a controlled
environment and that we are able to observe bidders’ private information which determines
the cost structure.
Our experiment of A+B auctions consists of four treatments comprised of varying
numbers of bidders and bid dimensions. This variation in competition and complexity,
as we will show later in the paper, is important for identification. More specifically, two
treatments involve four bidders in each auction, and in the remaining two, the number of
bidders is two. In terms of complexity, bidders have to choose both a price and quality
bid for two of the treatments, while they need to submit only a price bid in the remaining
treatments as the optimal quality level is provided to them.
Our analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we treat the private informa-
tion (values) about the cost structure as data and study the systematic deviation of bidder
behaviors from the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy based on the assigned private in-
formation. We investigate whether these observed discrepancies in human behavior are
consistent with the predictions of competing behavioral models, with a goal of obtaining a
better understanding of behavioral biases. In the second part of our analysis, we incorpo-
rate the behavioral aspects obtained from the initial analysis in structural auction models
and we evaluate these models’ ability to estimate bidders’ private cost information. This
exercise is particularly important because structural estimation methods have become in-
creasingly popular in empirical research on auctions. In these studies, economists estimate
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bidders’ private values, subsequently using them to study welfare or predict bidder behav-
iors in different counterfactual simulations, such as changes in auction design. Therefore,
the ability of structural models to generate accurate estimates of private values is essential.
Throughout our structural estimation, we treat each bidder’s private values as unknown in
order to mirror the information accessible to econometricians using field data. To assess
the performance of alternative structural models, we then measure the dfference between
the estimated and the assigned private values.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the alternative
models for A+B auction, followed by Section 2.3, which describes the experiment design
to uncover the behavior of the bidders. Section 2.4 examines if the bidder behaviors are
consistent with the models’ predictions, and Section 2.5 applies structural econometric
methods based on the models to estimate the bidders’ private information, while Section
2.6 provides a concluding summary of this study.
2.2 The Model
This section provides the formulation of the problem under study here. We follow
the notation in Quiroga et al. (2019). Consider a buyer who seeks to procure an indivisible
good (or service) for which there are N potential suppliers. Suppliers, indexed by j, know
the number of competitors they face, N–1, before submitting a quote or proposal. The
good is characterized by its price, p, and a quality attribute, q, that can be contractually
enforced.
Contracts are assigned using an A+B auction. As explained in the introduction, an
A+B auction scores contractors on both price p and quality q, awarding the contract to the
supplier with the highest valued score based on the scoring rule
S(p, q) = aq − p, (2.1)
where a is a common-knowledge constant and positive factor and its weight, a, reflects how
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much buyer value an additional increase in quality.
Supplier j’s profit pij from selling a good (p, q) (or equivalently, conditional on
winning the contract) is the quoted price minus the production cost, p–C(zj , q). Here zj is
a random signal for supplier j, drawn from bounded support [L,U ]. zj measuring supplier
j’s private information about his cost structure. We model supplier cost as the sum of a
quality-independent baseline cost and a quality-dependent cost structure:
C(zj , q) = F +
q
1+ 1
η
(1 + 1η )zj
. (2.2)
The baseline cost parameter F ≥ 0 is assumed to be a deterministic, non-sunk, fixed
cost to be incurred by the supplier only if the contract is won and the good is sold. For
simplicity, it is identical and known by all suppliers. This baseline cost can be interpreted as
the cost of completing a project at the minimally acceptable quality level. For example, the
quality dimension in Lewis and Bajari (2011) is acceleration time (completion time savings).
The baseline cost is, therefore, interpreted as completing the project by the deadline set
by original design engineer’s schedule. We made this baseline fixed cost common to all
suppliers when they win an auction, thus avoiding ex-ante asymmetry among suppliers as
neither supplier favoritism nor skill in estimating production costs are focal points in this
study.
In terms of the quality-dependent portion of the cost structure, this specification
yields a marginal cost (i.e., supply) function for quality dimension given by Cq(zj , q) =
∂C/∂q = q
1
η /zj ,implying a constant elasticity of supply for the quality, ∂lnq/∂lnCq = η.
Since the product quality literature in operations management usually assumes costs to
be quadratic in quality (e.g., Karmarkar and Pitbladdo 1997, Karaer et al. 2015), thus
implying a unit elasticity of supply for quality, we parameterized η = 1. Therefore, the
marginal cost of increasing the quality level for supplier j is q/zj , meaning the higher the
zj , the more efficient supplier j is at quality provision.
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2.2.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Model
2.2.1.1 Risk Neutral
If bidder j is risk neutral, then he submits sealed bid (p, q) to maximize his expected
utility,
max
p,q
(p− F − q
2
2zj
)xj , subject to s = aq − p, (2.3)
where xj is the probability j wins the auction.
A rational bidder of type zj with score sj will choose (p, q) to maximize profit
p − C(zj , q) conditional on winning. Substituting the score constraint in the objective
function yields
max
q
{aq − F − q
2
2zj
− sj}. (2.4)
From Equation 2.4, the optimal q does not depend on sj . Solving for Equation 2.4,
the optimal quality provision is
q∗j = azj . (2.5)
The optimal quality equates marginal benefit with marginal cost of quality. Fol-
lowing Che (1993); Asker and Cantillon (2008), we define a value function, referred to as a
pseudo-type, ν(zj), measuring the maximum social welfare a bidder of type zj can generate;
ν(zj) =
a2zj
2
− F. (2.6)
With this information, bidder j participating in this auction has an expected profit
given by
EΠj = (ν(zj)− sj)xj = (a
2zj
2
− F − sj)xj (2.7)
This expression is mathematically equivalent to a sealed-bid first-price auction with
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pseudo-types functioning as private valuations and scores assuming the role of prices. There-
fore, bidders’ preferences over outcomes (xj , sj) are fully captured by ν(zj). As Asker and
Cantillon (2008) show, pseudo-types are sufficient statistics for this auction mechanism
because once the distribution of pseudo-types is obtained, the result is a complete charac-
terization of the score auction and its outcome.
Now we can solve for the optimal price portion of the bid. Let s(ν) be a monotone
bidding function mapping pseudo-types ν onto score s in equilibrium. Using a result from
Riley and Samuelson (1981), the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (SBNE) score bid
b(νj) will satisfy the following expression at optimality,
s(νj) = νj − 1
N − 1
Fν(νj)
fν(νj)s′(νj)
. (2.8)
This expression fully characterizes the optimal bid strategy function, s(νj). This strategy
will depend on the resulting distribution of pseudo-types induced by the bidders’ efficiency
types, as well as on the number of bidders. This characterization describes optimal bids not
only at the pseudo-type and score level (given by Equation 2.8) but also by quality level
(given by Equation 2.5) and price (given by difference using the scoring rule). Therefore,
the optimal score and price bids are
s∗j = b(νj) = νj −
1
N − 1
G(s∗j )
g(s∗j )
(2.9)
p∗j = aq
∗
j − s∗j , (2.10)
where G(s) and g(s) are the CDF and PDF of the score distribution the human bidder
faces.
2.2.1.2 Risk Aversion
It has been widely observed that human bidders are likely to bid higher than the
Symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium bid in first price sealed-bid auctions. One common
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explanation for overbidding is that bidders are risk averse (e.g. Cox et al. 1985, 1988). Here,
we model the bidder utility function as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), Uj(pi) = pi
θj
and extend the method proposed by Campo et al. (2011) for analyzing risk aversion for first-
price auction to A+B auction; θj is bidder j’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, with θj = 1
representing risk neutrality.
It is easy to show that with risk aversion, conditional on winning, the quality opti-
mum score bid and pseudo-type still follow Equation 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. Therefore,
based on CRRA, the optimal score bid is presented by
s∗j = b(νj) = νj −
θj
N − 1
G(s∗j )
g(s∗j )
(2.11)
and optimal price bid follows Equation 2.10. If bidders are risk averse, then θ ∈ (0, 1). We
will see that the Nash equilibrium score bid under risk aversion, sRA∗, is larger than the
risk neutral Nash bid, sRN∗, conditional on private information. Intuitively, when facing
uncertainty, risk averse bidders are likely to bid more aggressively to increase the probability
of winning at the cost of a smaller profit if they win. The Nash equilibrium score bid still
remains linear in bidders’ private information.
2.2.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium Model
Because solving this differential equation is complex, we expect that bidders prob-
ably do not optimize and submit bids different from those predicted by the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. However, recent research in the experimental social sciences has used McK-
elvey and Palfrey (1995)’s Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model to model noise in
bidders’ decision making and, thus, reconcile deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions.
A frequently used variant of QRE is the logit model. Analogous to other discrete choice
models, in the logit equilibrium a bidder’s payoff is determined by his utility plus a random
perturbation following an i.i.d. extreme value process.
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Goeree et al. (2002) applied the QRE framework to auction settings and found
that QRE model, combined with risk aversion, predicts bidder behaviors in the first price
auction very well. Here we propose a way to extend the QRE model to A+B auctions.
Let P = {p1, p2, ..., p#p} and Q = {q1, q2, ..., q#q} represent the set of all possible values
of price and quality bidders can choose, respectively. The set of all possible values of
private information z is Z = {z1, z2, ..., zZ}. A bidding strategy summarized by S(p, q|z)
measures the probability that a bidder will choose any combination of (p, q) bid conditional
on his private information z. For the strategy to be a well-defined probability measure, no
price and quality bid should receive a negative probability, and conditional on any private
information z, the sum of the probability of all possible price and quality combinations
being chosen equals to one.
S(p, q|z) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ P, q ∈ Q, and z ∈ Z, (2.12)
and ∑
p∈P
∑
q∈Q
S(p, q|z) = 1 for any z ∈ Z. (2.13)
If all bidders follow the same bidding strategy B(p, q|z), the probability that bidder
j wins the auction with a bid (p, q) satisfies
x(s) =
[∑
z∈Z
∑
s′<s
S(p, q|z)f(z)
]N−1
, where s = aq − p. (2.14)
In the QRE model, the expected utility of bidder j with private information zj is,
u(p, q; zj) = (p− F − q
2
2zj
)θ × x(s) + ε = pi(p, q|zj)θx(s) + ε, (2.15)
where s = aq − p, and the optimization error ε is assumed to be i.i.d. with a CDF of
F (ε) = exp[− exp(−λε)], with a mean of γ/λ and a variance of pi2/6λ2. The probability
that bidder j chooses (p, q) conditional on a private value draw zj in a A+B auction with
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N − 1 bidders follows
σ(p, q; zj) =
exp
(
λpi(p, q|zj)θx(s)
)∑
p′∈P
∑
q′∈Q exp
(
λpi(p′, q′|zj)θx(s)
) . (2.16)
According to McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), equilibrium exists, and the strategy
S(p, q|zj) = σ(p, q; zj). As λ → 0, the variance of the optimization error goes to infinity,
meaning that when optimization is too costly, bidders would choose randomly. On the other
hand, as λ→∞, the variance of the error term goes to zero, and the equilibrium converges
to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Experimental Design
For our experiments, we consider four treatments, varying the number of bidders,
N , and the number of bidding dimensions. These are summarized in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Description of Treatments and Sample Size
Treatments A+B auction Price only
N=4 (1 human vs 3 automatans) T1 (21 participants) T2 (22 participants)
N=2 (1 human vs 1 automaton) T3 (29 participants) T4 (24 participants)
The streams of random production efficiency types were the same for all treatments
(although the efficiency types were re-drawn after every period, every auction had the same
N draws within a given round). Half of the participants were assigned to each treatment,
and we used a between-subjects design.
Participants were matched in groups of N bidders for 50 rounds against N–1 au-
tomated bidders pre-programmed to play the Symmetric Bayes Nash Equilibrium strategy
bids. Subjects were informed that “competitors are pre-programmed to place bids with the
goal to obtain the highest profit possible.” The experimental design aims to avoid social
considerations (e.g., level-k theory) in the bidding process so that the participants were
motivated to think and submit the best bids possible. The bidders were not allowed to
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participate in more than one session nor more than one treatment. They were compensated
based on their performance in terms of profits.
Experimental Parameterization. In our experiments, we considered the effi-
ciency type zj to be uniformly distributed between L = 10 and U = 90, elasticity of supply
for quality η to be equal to unity, and the baseline cost F to be equal to 500. We fixed the
buyer’s quality preference factor to a = 10. These parameters provided bidders a numerical
setting simple enough for them to handle, yet one that still captured the real-world features
of the problem.
Because the computers were pre-programmed to place risk neutral SBNE bids, com-
puters’ strategy and distribution of bids given the parameterization follow:
ν =
1
2
a2z − F = 50z − 500 ∼ unif [0, 4000] (2.17)
q∗ = az = 10z ∼ unif [100, 900] (2.18)
s∗ = b(νj) =
N − 1
N
νj =

37.5z − 375 ∼ unif [0, 3000] if N = 4
25z − 250 ∼ unif [0, 2000] if N = 2
(2.19)
p∗ = aq∗ − s∗ =

62.5z + 375 ∼ [1000, 6000] if N = 4
75z − 250 ∼ [500, 6500] if N = 2
(2.20)
In terms of scores, optimal bidding suggests that the SBNE scoring bid for the TS case
with these parameters should be (N − 1)/N = 75% of the bidder’s pseudo-type νj (optimal
bid-shading) in the case of 4 bidders and (N − 1)/N = 5% in the corresponding case of 2
bidders.
In Treatments T1 and T3, bidders had to submit a simultaneous bid on price p
and quality q based on their observed private efficiency type z. In Treatments T2 and T4,
bidders observed the efficiency and the quality level chosen on their behalf based on their
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efficiency (q∗j = 10zj). Bidders only need to submit a bid on price p. This design effectively
reduced the dimensionality of the problem to a price-only procurement auction.
Procedure. A total of 96 subjects participated in the 4 treatments, and each session
involved only one treatment. Each subject was compensated a proportion of their total
earnings for all 50 rounds plus a $10 participation fee. The average pay was approximately
$23, and each subject participated only in one session. Payment was made in private at
the end of the session, and cash was the only incentive offered. Quality units, revenues,
costs and profits were expressed in experimental currency units (ECUs). All ECUs earned
throughout the session were transformed into U.S. dollars at a pre-specified rate of 1,100
ECUs per $1.
All sessions were conducted at a major public research university, using the subject
pool associated with the business school. Subjects privately read the printed instructions
(see Appendix A for more details). Then, the researcher read the same instructions aloud
and showed screen captures as examples. Approximately 10 minutes were used for reading
instructions and answering questions, and 80 minutes were used for the decision task.
We programmed the experimental interface using the zTree system (Fischbacher
2007). The bidding screen included the realization of efficiency type zj as well as the pa-
rameters for fixed cost F = 500 and weight a = 10. It also included a table showing all
relevant information from past periods (own offered price and quality, winning price and
quality, profits, etc.). The cost function and scoring function equations were provided on
the instructions and the bidding screen. Because the decision task is computationally chal-
lenging, we also provided the participants with a decision support tool that automatically
calculated the appropriate costs and earnings for winning the auction using the efficiency
type and their inputs of price and quality. Because of this tool, the bidders were prevented
from incurring computational mistakes that accidentally would result in bids generating
a negative profit. After subjects in an auction submitted their offers, they saw a results
screen showing if they had won, their own offered price and quality, the auction’s winning
price and quality, their resulting profits, and a table showing the history of all their rounds.
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Subjects were made aware they were matched with automated computers in every round.
2.4 Reduced Form Analysis
In this section, we treat bidders’ private information about their cost structure and
the derived SBNE strategy as given, and we study if the models discussed in section 2.2 are
able to describe their behavior. We first drop the data from the first 10 rounds of auctions
to exclude the effect of learning on our analysis. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics for
the bidders’ behavior over the final 40 auctions for each of the treatments (a more detailed
summary of each bidder’s behavior can be found in Appendix B). Across all four treatments,
we can see that an average bidder’s percentage of winning is higher than the risk-neutral
SBNE predicted probability of winning, while his average requested profit per auction (not
conditional on winning) is smaller than the profit that can be realized by following the risk-
neutral SBNE strategy.1 This result seems to support the risk-averse theory. Comparing
Treatment 1 with Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 with Treatment 4, we can see that when
the auction is in A+B format, both the percentage of winning and the requested profit is
smaller than when bidders need to bid in only one dimension (quality is optimally given).
This result provides evidence that when the complexity of the auction format increases,
bidders are more likely to make errors in determining their optimal strategy. The increased
difficulty in decision making in the A+B format is also seen in the score bids. However, the
average score bids in the A+B auctions are smaller than those predicted by the risk-neutral
SBNE strategy, contrasting with the prediction of risk aversion. Before we analyze the
bidders’ behaviors more closely, we examine the extent to which complexity in the A+B
design affects its ability to efficiently allocate resources.
Unlike Table 2.2 that shows the bidder’s behavior over all auction runs regardless of
winning, Table 2.3 evaluates the performance of different designs by examining how human
1The RN SBNE column shows the auction outcome if a bidder follows the risk-neutral SBNE strategy
based on the private information draws in the experiment. The numbers are slightly different from the
theoretical mean because of the limited number of random draws from the distribution. For example, the
theoretical probability of winning for 2 bidders is 50%; however, in this experiment, it is 45%.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Bidding Behavior per Treatment
N=4 N=2
T1 T2 T3 T4
Mean SD Mean SD RN SBNE Mean SD Mean SD RN SBNE
% wins 32.5% 8.3% 37.0% 5.8% 25.0% 47.1% 12.7% 54.6% 8.6% 45.0%
avg price 4741.28 703.57 3582.15 196.27 3629.77 4670.62 761.68 4038.99 176.22 4155.72
avg quality 589.51 47.74 520.76 0 520.76 562.99 60.96 520.76 0 520.76
avg score 1153.8 444.94 1625.47 196.27 1577.86 959.32 391.27 1168.63 176.22 1051.91
avg profit 163.21 57.71 200.71 48.61 206.05 419.12 144.07 568.33 84.53 662.82
# of bidders 21 22 29 24
Table 2.3: Evaluation of Auction Design Competition and Complexity on Human Winning
T1 T2 T3 T4
Actual
Buyer Surplus 2507.63 2480.35 1756.66 1646.32
Bidder Profit 502.19 541.79 890.44 1041.22
Total Surplus 3009.82 3022.14 2647.10 2687.54
Optimal
Buyer Surplus 2339.25 2300.32 1447.54 1409.80
Bidder Profit 779.75 766.77 1447.54 1409.80
Total Surplus 3119.00 3067.09 2895.07 2819.59
decision making errors impact auction outcome. This table excludes data from the auction
runs where the human bidder loses.2 By comparing the total surplus between the actual and
the optimal outcomes across treatment, A+B auctions appear to perform well in choosing
the most efficient supplier. However, the actual bidder profit is lower, and the buyer surplus
is higher than optimal comparing A+B auction with its price only counterpart. However,
our evaluation based on this experiment is limited because in the field, quality is never
optimally given based on bidder’s private information. A better comparison is between the
A+B auction and the price only auction with a minimum quality threshold. Nevertheless,
our result suggests that the A+B auction is efficient despite increased bidding complexity.
2.4.1 Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we examine whether bidder behavior follows a symmetric Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium strategy. Human bidders face bids submitted by computers following the
2Buyer surplus is measured by score bid; total surplus is the sum of buyer surplus and bidder profit.
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SBNE strategy. Assume that human bidders have a rational expectation of the distribution
of other bidders’ (computers) score bids, then G(s) is the CDF of an uniform distribution
with support [0, 3000] for Treatment 1 and 2 and [0, 2000] for Treatment 3 and 4. Therefore,
based on Equation 2.9 and 2.11, the risk-neutral SBNE strategy for score bid for human
bidders is
s∗j =
N − 1
N
νj , (2.21)
and the risk-averse SBNE strategy for score bid is
s∗j =
N − 1
N − 1 + θj νj . (2.22)
Given this function form, we estimate θj using the following regression,
sjt = αj + βjνjt + εjt. (2.23)
Then we are able to calculate the risk-aversion rate θj =
1−βˆj
βˆj
(N − 1). We run Equation
2.23 separately for all bidders across treatment. Table 2.4 reports the mean and standard
deviation for each bidder’s intercept, slope, and the implied risk aversion. First, we see
that the average αj across all treatments is negative, meaning that when pseudo-type ν is
small, human bidders tend to submit negative score bids. This result contradicts the SBNE
theory because the score distribution has non-negative support, and a negative score bid is
strictly dominated. In addition, we see the estimated average risk aversion varies greatly
across treatments, ranging from -0.50 to 0.79. It is unlikely that a different auction format
changes the risk preferences of bidders. To conclude, we do not find evidence from our data
that the SBNE strategy predicts bidder behaviors accurately.
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Table 2.4: Score Bid Regression Results
T1 T2 T3 T4
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Intercept -1542.40 1007.26 -280.84 604.54 -731.1 685.37 -96.34 409.97
slope 1.28 0.32 0.91 0.22 0.8 0.28 0.60 0.17
risk aversion -0.50 0.72 0.46 0.65 0.4 0.49 0.79 0.54
2.4.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium
Since the scores human bidders face are uniform-distributed, based on Equation
2.16, in Treatment 1 and 3, human bidders’ QRE strategy follows
S(p, q; zj) =
exp
(
λpi(p, q|zj)θx(s)
)∑
p′∈P
∑
q′∈Q exp
(
λpi(p′, q′|zj)θx(s′)
) , (2.24)
where s = aq − p, and in Treatment 2 and 4
S(p; zj) =
exp
(
λpi(p|zj)θx(s)
)∑
p′∈P exp
(
λpi(p′|zj)θx(s′)
) , (2.25)
where s = a(az)− p.
We can see from Equation 2.24 and 2.25 that the probability each possible bid
((p, q) in A+B auction and p in price only auction) chosen by an individual depends on (i)
the expected utility that the bid generates and (ii) the number of possible bids. If a bid
generates low expected utility, then it is likely to be chosen. On the other hand, holding
the expected utility generated by a bid constant, if other more possible bids are available,
it reduces the probability of this bid being chosen. Therefore, the increased complexity in
A+B auction is directly reflected in the enlarged dimension of possible bids. In the price
only auction (Treatment 2 and 4), the number of possible bids is only #p, while in A+B
auction (Treatment 1 and 3), the number of possible bids is #p × #q. This prediction is
reflected in Figure 2.1, where we compare the relationship between the actual score bids and
the private information z across all 4 treatments. First, we can see that the actual bids do
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not follow the SBNE strategy perfectly; rather they are dispersed around it, confirming our
conclusion in the previous subsection. Second, we see that across all 4 treatments, when
the efficiency draws are lower, the score bids are more noisy (wider confidence interval),
and when efficiency draws are higher, the observed score bids are less noisy and follow the
SBNE strategy closer. In addition, comparing Treatments 1 and 3 with Treatments 2 and
4 indicates that the deviation in the score bids from the SBNE strategy is larger for the
A+B auction than for the price only auction, a direct result from the higher dimension of
the bids. Furthermore, the discrepancies in score bids seem to be larger in Treatments 1
and 2 than in Treatments 3 and 4 because the higher number of bidders results in lower
expected profit and, thus, more noise in decision making.
Figure 2.1: Observed Score Bids and Risk-Neutral SBNE Score Bids
Another impotent feature shown in Figure 2.1 is that the relationship between the
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actual score bids and the private information is non-linear. In all 4 treatments, when
efficiency levels are lower, we observe more underbidding in the scores. This feature has not
been observed by other experimental papers on first price sealed-bid auction. A potential
reason for this result is the difference in experimental design. In the other experimental
papers, the bidders are assigned a private value, and they bid the price they want to pay.
Because price cannot be negative, the possible price bid are bounded between the bidder’s
private value and zero. However, according to the instruction for our experiment (Appendix
A), bidders can choose any price value between 0 to 10,000 and a quality value greater than
0. In addition, the software automatically calculates and displays the bidders’ costs and
earnings based on their choice of price and quality bid. It also addresses that if the price is
below cost, a bidder will lose money. Consequently, bidders will not choose a combination
of price and quality that generates a negative profit. However, since the resulting score from
a price and quality bid is not calculated and displayed by the system, bidders are likely to
choose a negative score. Although negative scores are dominant in the SBNE, in the QRE,
because of the optimization error, the probability of bidders choosing a negative score is
non-negative. Figure 2.2 shows the expected utility when the efficiency draw is low (z = 20)
and the highest expected utility is only 0.24 ECU. The area below the lower boundary of
the 0 contour shows the price and quality combination that yields negative profits. Because
the expected utility is close to 0, bidders only choose almost uniformly from the area lies
in the top-left of the lower 0 contour boundary, suggesting we see underbidding when the
efficiency level is low.
Figure 2.3 plots the expected utility when the efficiency level z = 50. The price and
quality combination that generates the highest expected utility is 3500 and 500. When we
hold the price bid constant and change the quality bid, the deviation in the latter from the
optimal value results in a larger utility loss than when we fix the quality bid and adjust the
price bid. As a result, under QRE, we expect to see a larger deviation from the optimal
in the price bid than in the quality bid. As shown in Figure 2.4, the price bids of the
human bidders are very noisy, more so in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 3, where the
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Figure 2.2: Price and Quality Bids Contour z = 20, N = 4
Figure 2.3: Price and Quality Bids Contour z = 50, N = 4
larger number of bidders reduces the incentive to choose optimally. In contrast, as shown in
Figure 2.5 and Table 2.5, bidders do reasonably well at choosing the quality level although
they tend to choose higher than optimal quality bids. There is no significant difference in
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quality bids in Treatments 1 and 3, as the probability of winning varies by competition
intensity. This result is consistent with theory.
Figure 2.4: Observed Price Bids and SBNE Price Bids
Table 2.5: Quality Bid Regression
T1 I T1 II T3 I T3 II
Intercept 217.9236*** 116.2660***
(9.8317) (10.0058)
z4 7.1354*** 10.7043*** 8.5783*** 10.4824***
(0.1744) (0.0842) (0.1774) (0.0719)
N 840 840 1160 1160
R2 0.67 0.95 0.67 0.95
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Figure 2.5: Observed Quality Bids and SBNE Quality Bids
2.5 Structural Analysis
In this section, we treat bidders’ private information about their cost structure as
unknown. We apply structural estimation methods based on the models discussed above
to estimate bidders’ private information. We further evaluate the prediction accuracy of
different models.
2.5.1 A Probability Weighting/Prospect Theoretical Framework Under
Risk Neutrality
Bidders decide among risky alternatives. If we assume that human bidders are risk
neutral but have difficulty assessing the probability associated with the different events
linked to their decisions, a structural estimate of the probability measure of the pseudo-
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types implicit would yield a measure of this probability.
Since structural nonparametric estimates of the pseudo-type and its distribution are
identified, as shown by Quiroga (2015)’s extension of the Guerre et al. (2000)’s identification
results for multiattribute bids, we can use the resulting estimates as behavioral measures
of both the implicit valuation and the associated probability weights. As a result and given
that the losses realm is precluded by our experimental design, all that Prospect Theory
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992) can prescribe accurately is the distortion in the probability
weights, and if this is the case, the Kernel-based nonparametric estimates of the PDF and
CDF of the pseudo-types would, in theory, be the most appropriate measures available for
this phenomenon.
First stage estimates: Empirical Pseudo-types. As a first step in the consecu-
tion of the distributions, we obtain nonparametric estimates of the empirical pseudo-types
from the following relationship:
νˆj = sj +
1
N − 1
Gˆ(sj)
gˆ(sj)
(2.26)
While this result was derived under a fully rational risk neutral framework, it can be ex-
tended to the perceived probability Gˆ(sj) used by subjects in their choice evaluations, itself
a behaviorally distorted measure of the true probability measure for the actual pseudo-types,
Fν(ν), which will be obtained in the second stage estimates.
Figure 2.6 displays plots of the induced values (pseudo-types) against the kernel
estimated values (empirical pseudo-types) for each treatment. We used the standard Guerre
et al. (2000) sample trimming procedure to address the boundary effects inherent in kernel
density estimation. More specifically, we discarded the value estimates corresponding to
the bids that lay in [bmin, bmin +h]∪ [bmax−h, bmax], where h is the bandwidth determined
by the Hardin rule of thumb. Throughout this paper, we use sample trimming as a default
method for kernel estimation. In addition to boundary trimming, we also discarded the top
and bottom 5% of the value estimates in order to obtain results in the strict interior of the
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distributions.
These graphs show how heterogeneous the implicit (i.e., estimated) valuation is
across bids, especially when compared to the induced valuation (which is denoted by the
solid black line). T2 (price only, 3 competitors) is once again the most stable around the
induced pseudo-types line.
Figure 2.6: Plots of Induced Pseudo-types and Estimated Valuations
Second stage estimates: Empirical Probabilities. With the first stage esti-
mates, we can again use kernel methods to retrieve the probability densities and cumulative
distribution functions implicit in the suppliers’ score bid decisions.
Figure 2.7 shows the estimated probability weighting functions in terms of CDFs.
The CDFs are evaluated between the 5th and 95th percentiles of the induced pseudo-types.
Confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap, conducted by randomly choosing 15
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bidders from all bidders in a treatment 1,000 times. The CI of estimated values is con-
structed using the subsamples at the 5th and 95th percentile. CDFs of the estimated values
are calculated using the average of the estimated values of all subsamples.
Figure 2.7: Probability Weighting Functions Estimated via Nonparametric CDFs of Em-
pirical Valuations
In T1, the CDF of the estimated values is higher than the CDF of the induced
pseudo-types, implying first-order stochastic dominance of the pseudo-types over the esti-
mated values. This is a direct effect of the combination of higher complexity (bids in two
dimensions) and high competition. The results from T3, except for the case with very low
values, are opposite from the first-order stochastic dominance, which from parallelism is
inferred as a competition effect.
For T2 and T4, no clear dominance results are implied, and the shape of the curve
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underweights probabilities for lower values with respect to the induced probability, and
overweights probabilities for higher values, results that contradict what Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) suggested would be the traditional psychological bias in probabilities (which
is predicted to have an inverse S-shape as opposed to the S-shape observed in treatments
T2 and T4). Our results for these two treatments, hence, suggest increased sensitivity as
opposed to the diminishing sensitivity hypothesis of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It is
not entirely unexpected, as earlier works (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Nagarajan and
Shechter 2014) had already provided evidence of the problems that probability weighting
bias/prospect theoretical frameworks face in rationalizing other decision problems under
uncertainty such as the news vendor problem. Here, we cannot ignore that the probability
measures used by bidders might be distorted and that this distortion may be the explanation
for the bidding behavior far from the standard SBNE solution. However, we acknowledge
that there is more work to be done in this respect.
Table 2.6 summarizes the estimated results. We evaluated goodness of fit of the
nonparametric estimates of the Risk Neutral Model to the SBNE prediction using the
Kolmogorov Smirnov (KS) statistic as used in Bajari and Hortacsu (2005),
KS =
√
T max
[ν0,ν1]
|Fˆ (ν)− F (ν)|. (2.27)
In addition, we also computed the norms L1 and L2 as measures of distance:
L1 =
1
T
∑
j,t
|νˆjt − νjt| (2.28)
L2 =
[ 1
T
∑
j,t
(νˆjt − νjt)2
]1/2
(2.29)
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results for the Nonparametric Kernel Risk Neutral Model
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we conducted an experiment of A+B auction and examined bidders’
behavior. We found that bidder behaviors systematically deviate from the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium strategy. However, despite the increased noise in bidders’ decision making due
to increased complexity in the scoring rule, A+B auction performs well in terms of dis-
covering the most efficient supplier. We further proposed a way to model complexity, by
extending the Quantal Response Equilibrium to A+B auctions. We found that the system-
atic deviations of bidder behaviors from the Bayes-Nash prediction across different levels of
competition and complexity in the auction format are consistent with the predictions of the
Quantal Response Equilibrium model. We also evaluated the ability of the Bayesian-Nash
Equilibrium model to estimate bidders’ private values using a nonparametric method, but
the measures performed poorly as expected. We are hopeful that structural methods based
on the Quantal Response Equilibrium model will generate reasonable estimates.
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Appendix A Experiment Instruction
Instruction
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making.
If you follow these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you will earn money that
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. If you have a question at any time,
please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to your station and answer it. We
ask that you not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment.
Government agencies or companies often ask suppliers to participate in a Procure-
ment Auction by submitting a bid to supply equipment or construct a building, a bridge
or a highway. These bids are often at a combination of price, quality and possibly other
factors.
In this experiment, you will be in the role of a Supplier (Bidder) who participates
in 40 Procurement Auctions, competing against three (3) computerized competitors
(there are 4 suppliers in total). Your competitors are pre-programmed to place bids with
the goal to obtain the highest profit possible.
The session consists of 50 separate auction rounds, and you will submit a bid in
each round. The unit of exchange in all the transactions is called experimental currency
units (ECUs). At the end of the session, your earnings in ECUs will be converted to US
dollars at a pre-specified rate, and paid to you in cash.
How you earn money
Each bid you make consists of (A) a money price you request in ECUs (“Your
Price”), and (B) a quality level (“Your Chosen Quality”). The buyer has established a
scoring rule to compare bids submitted by each supplier. Supplier Score increases with
Chosen Quality, and decreases with Price:
Supplier Score = (Buyer Quality Weighting * Your Chosen Quality) – Your Price
“Buyer Quality Weighting” represents the evaluation the buyer makes about the
quality level offered by any supplier. It is a positive constant, known and common to all
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bidders, and equal to 10.
The highest score among all four competitors wins the contract (Any ties in supplier
scores are broken at random). You earn money each time you win a contract at a good
price and appropriate quality. If you win the contract:
Your Earnings = Your Price – Your Cost
If you don’t win the contract, your profit, your earnings and your cost will be 0
regardless of your bid.
Only if you win the contract, you incur a production cost (“Your Cost”) to produce
the good at Your Chosen Quality. This cost varies based on Your Efficiency and Fixed
Costs:
Your Cost =
(
0.5× (Your Chosen Quality)
2
Your Efficiency
)
+ Fixed Costs
You will see Your Efficiency before deciding how much to bid, but not the efficiency
of any other competitor. For each bidder, the higher the efficiency, the cheaper it is to offer
the chosen quality level. Your Efficiency will change from round to round; it is independent
from your competitors’ efficiencies, and is unrelated to your efficiency in any other auctions.
Your Efficiency is a random number within the range [10, 90], with all values in that range
being equally likely. Fixed Costs are the same and are known for all bidders before each
auction, but are only incurred by the winner.
For each auction, enter a number for Your Price and another for Your Chosen
Quality in the boxes on your computer screen, and then click the “Make Offer” button. For
price decisions you can chose any number between 0 and 10,000. For quality levels, you can
choose any number from 0 and above. Your decisions can have up to two decimals.
With the above information, you will be able to calculate Your Cost and Your
Earnings in each round in case you win. Our software has an embedded simulator you can
use for this. Each bidder knows only their own cost, but not the cost of any other bidder.
68
Note: If a supplier bids his/her Price below his/her Cost, and wins the auction,
he/she loses money. Therefore, carefully choose your price and quality. Hint: Use the
Simulator tool for this purpose.
Information you will see at the end of each auction
At the end of each auction you will see the following information:
• Your own efficiency and bid (price and quality) in this auction.
• Your Cost (which will only be different from 0 if you win).
• The winning bid (price and quality).
• Your earnings from the auction.
You will also have access to this information for all past auctions.
How you will be paid
At the end of the session you will see the final screen summarizing your earnings for
the session. This screen will calculate your net profits from the 50 auctions, convert them
to US dollars at the rate of 1,100 ECU per $1, and add them to your $5 participation fee.
Please use this information to fill out your check-out form and wait quietly until
the experimenter calls you to come to the front of the room and be paid your earnings in
private and in cash. After you have been paid, you may leave the laboratory.
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Appendix B Summary Statistics on Individual Bidder’s Be-
havior per Treatment
Table 7: Treatment 1 Summary Statistics on Individual Behavior
treatment % wins avg price avg quality avg score avg profit
10101 1 42.5% 4531.25 609.98 1568.50 161.21
10102 1 30.0% 5000.21 615.16 1151.37 38.85
10201 1 32.5% 4916.52 621.62 1299.72 186.54
10202 1 40.0% 4328.08 585.14 1523.29 209.58
10301 1 25.0% 4978.93 579.26 813.63 151.23
10302 1 17.5% 5459.55 596.68 507.20 120.53
10401 1 22.5% 3742.90 521.83 1475.38 191.43
10402 1 20.0% 5784.25 612.45 340.25 126.58
10501 1 42.5% 4927.12 621.85 1291.38 95.57
10502 1 42.5% 5120.75 633.42 1213.50 253.57
10503 1 40.0% 3836.18 553.62 1700.08 208.91
10601 1 40.0% 5596.08 682.50 1228.92 37.42
10602 1 37.5% 4007.25 563.80 1630.75 163.69
10603 1 20.0% 5840.10 593.17 91.64 186.89
10701 1 35.0% 3863.89 549.55 1631.60 220.98
10702 1 30.0% 5422.50 636.00 937.50 211.63
10703 1 30.0% 4151.20 505.45 903.30 156.94
10801 1 25.0% 4662.88 595.25 1289.62 180.88
10802 1 32.5% 5391.85 623.43 842.41 241.48
10803 1 42.5% 4423.18 601.65 1593.33 146.22
10804 1 35.0% 3582.25 477.88 1196.50 137.33
Mean 32.5% 4741.28 589.51 1153.80 163.21
SD 8.3% 703.57 47.74 444.94 57.71
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Table 8: Treatment 2 Summary Statistics on Individual Behavior
treatment % wins avg price avg quality avg score avg profit
20101 2 45.0% 3391.00 520.76 1816.62 112.90
20201 2 32.5% 3596.42 520.76 1611.20 234.79
20202 2 30.0% 3884.25 520.76 1323.37 106.40
20301 2 40.0% 3819.38 520.76 1388.25 189.89
20302 2 32.5% 3617.50 520.76 1590.12 208.89
20401 2 25.0% 3786.30 520.76 1421.32 209.04
20402 2 37.5% 3691.25 520.76 1516.37 205.70
20403 2 35.0% 3554.38 520.76 1653.25 246.91
20404 2 40.0% 3494.88 520.76 1712.75 121.02
20405 2 32.5% 3424.56 520.76 1783.06 102.51
20501 2 32.5% 3641.68 520.76 1565.95 258.87
20502 2 42.5% 3450.00 520.76 1757.62 249.16
20503 2 27.5% 3730.48 520.76 1477.15 223.20
20504 2 32.5% 4143.23 520.76 1064.40 196.66
20505 2 42.5% 3442.00 520.76 1765.62 236.54
20601 2 42.5% 3388.05 520.76 1819.57 179.25
20602 2 37.5% 3523.00 520.76 1684.62 217.79
20603 2 45.0% 3328.50 520.76 1879.12 183.40
20604 2 42.5% 3423.30 520.76 1784.32 219.57
20605 2 42.5% 3445.00 520.76 1762.62 222.29
20701 2 40.0% 3537.25 520.76 1670.37 249.74
20702 2 37.5% 3495.00 520.76 1712.62 241.04
Mean 37.0% 3582.15 520.76 1625.47 200.71
SD 5.8% 196.27 0.00 196.27 48.61
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Table 9: Treatment 3 Summary Statistics on Individual Behavior
treatment % wins avg price avg quality avg score avg profit
30101 3 45.0% 5758.75 636.05 601.75 335.92
30102 3 65.0% 4281.82 576.33 1481.42 55.53
30103 3 27.5% 4890.42 567.15 781.08 424.89
30104 3 70.0% 4154.38 590.45 1750.12 93.16
30105 3 32.5% 5301.42 556.20 260.56 348.54
30201 3 35.0% 6151.90 675.32 601.33 450.89
30202 3 32.5% 5176.93 549.67 319.74 353.14
30203 3 37.5% 3897.49 472.50 827.49 288.73
30301 3 40.0% 4482.00 534.33 861.25 560.25
30302 3 57.5% 4560.38 577.22 1211.88 532.27
30303 3 40.0% 3755.62 451.88 763.12 447.51
30304 3 67.5% 3774.88 529.12 1516.38 232.10
30305 3 50.0% 4153.50 530.62 1152.75 566.59
30401 3 37.5% 4755.25 565.38 898.50 516.52
30402 3 25.0% 5989.70 619.25 202.80 382.24
30403 3 40.0% 4451.48 514.83 696.78 587.69
30404 3 55.0% 5010.00 620.01 1190.12 339.97
30405 3 42.5% 6048.68 692.35 874.82 290.53
30406 3 50.0% 5303.75 643.50 1131.25 506.87
30501 3 40.0% 4502.58 533.85 835.92 414.77
30502 3 42.5% 4599.50 549.50 895.50 549.54
30503 3 57.5% 3980.88 529.62 1315.38 583.79
30504 3 42.5% 4290.00 486.25 572.50 397.41
30505 3 45.0% 5620.00 659.25 972.50 495.01
30601 3 47.5% 4711.25 566.50 953.75 575.14
30602 3 70.0% 3388.75 506.80 1679.25 233.08
30603 3 70.0% 3508.50 479.25 1284.00 519.70
30604 3 47.5% 4895.75 585.65 960.75 509.54
30605 3 52.5% 4052.55 528.00 1227.45 563.19
Mean 47.1% 4670.62 562.99 959.32 419.12
SD 12.7% 761.68 60.96 391.27 144.07
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Table 10: Treatment 4 Summary Statistics on Individual Behavior
treatment % wins avg price avg quality avg score avg profit
40101 4 62.5% 3750.62 520.76 1457.00 481.37
40102 4 50.0% 3921.72 520.76 1285.90 275.70
40103 4 47.5% 4164.40 520.76 1043.22 547.06
40104 4 55.0% 3961.25 520.76 1246.37 569.29
40105 4 37.5% 4278.13 520.76 929.49 537.36
40201 4 57.5% 3941.38 520.76 1266.25 544.79
40202 4 65.0% 3994.35 520.76 1213.27 597.69
40203 4 52.5% 4223.50 520.76 984.12 595.75
40204 4 47.5% 3958.75 520.76 1248.87 514.49
40205 4 55.0% 4232.30 520.76 975.32 583.76
40301 4 62.5% 3982.08 520.76 1225.55 680.94
40302 4 60.0% 3933.65 520.76 1273.97 638.02
40303 4 47.5% 4174.89 520.76 1032.74 605.22
40304 4 72.5% 3724.80 520.76 1482.82 523.81
40401 4 57.5% 3991.48 520.76 1216.15 648.71
40402 4 65.0% 3753.75 520.76 1453.87 510.30
40403 4 42.5% 4211.48 520.76 996.15 547.37
40404 4 62.5% 3910.01 520.76 1297.61 564.57
40405 4 45.0% 4278.75 520.76 928.87 645.46
40501 4 55.0% 4206.05 520.76 1001.57 690.57
40502 4 65.0% 3885.00 520.76 1322.62 624.45
40503 4 47.5% 3991.25 520.76 1216.37 508.79
40504 4 50.0% 4252.50 520.76 955.12 643.27
40505 4 47.5% 4213.70 520.76 993.92 561.24
Mean 54.6% 4038.99 520.76 1168.63 568.33
SD 8.6% 176.22 0.00 176.22 84.53
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